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"Unfair" Trade Injury: A CompetitionBased Approach
Diane P. Wood*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans like to believe that they believe in competition, whether
on the playing field, at the factory, in the boardroom, or in the classroom. The most ringing affirmation of that belief in the American
legal system is the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,1 which the Supreme
Court once described as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise. ' ' 2 The
free enterprise competitive system is so important that the Court has
repeatedly stressed that the antitrust laws protect "competition, not
competitors." 3 If an individual firm loses market share, or even goes
out of business, because others have bested it in a fair fight, this is a
sign that the system is working as it should. In the end, everyone benefits from this system: Consumers benefit from the greatest selection of
goods and services at the lowest prices, and producers benefit from the
efficient production methods and the incentives to innovate inherent in
a competitive marketplace.
The antitrust laws are not, however, the only U.S. statutes that regulate competition. My immediate topic is the other principal set of competition laws, known loosely as the trade statutes. 4 When the
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I gratefully acknowledge
the support for this research provided by the Kirkland & Ellis Faculty Research Fund and the
Sonnenschein Fund. I also thank Frank Easterbrook and Alan Sykes for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
2. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
3. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); see also Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
4. The phrase "trade statutes" usually encompasses a number of related laws, all of
which regulate the terms of international trade in one way or another. The Tariff Act of 1930,
(the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act), as amended, contains provisions that authorize additional
tariffs whenever a foreign producer engages in "dumping"--selling at a lower price in the
United States than in the home market-or whenever the foreign product enjoys governmental subsidies that confer some kind of international trading advantage. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303,
1671a-1671h, 1673a-1673g, 1677 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Injury to the domestic industry is
usually a prerequisite for antidumping or countervailing duties. For a general description, see
JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS § 10.2 (dumping), § 10.3 (subsidies and countervailing dudes) (2d ed. 1986). The
Trade Act of 1974 also contains several important provisions. The so-called escape clause
(section 201 of the 1974 Act) permits the imposition of duties when imports have increased
dramatically over a relatively short period of time, thereby causing serious injury to the do-
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competition at issue takes the form of imports from foreign producers,
a curious amnesia about the virtues of the competitive process seems to
afflict many observers. Among members of the bar whose practice includes both antitrust and trade cases, it has become the accepted wisdom that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the antitrust laws,
with their consumer welfare orientation, and the trade statutes, with
their producer or labor orientation. 5 As Paula Stem, a former Commissioner on the United States International Trade Commission, put it:
Implicit in our trade law is the notion that U.S. workers and businesses
should compete on the basis of comparative advantage, but they should
not have to adjust to unfairly traded goods. Consumers are expected
to forgo the savings resulting from
dumping or subsidies in the inter6
ests of producers of the product.
mestic industry. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (described more fully in
supra, at §§ 9.2-9.3). Section 406 of the 1974 Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2436
(1982), operates as a similar mechanism to protect U.S. industries from greatly increased imports from Communist countries. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in connection with importation, and is
frequently used to protect intellectual property rights. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337-1337a (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); see also Tariff Act of 1930, § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) (making it unlawful
for a foreign party to import a good bearing a trademark registered by a U.S. party into the
United States). Finally, unfair trade practices may be attacked under the general authority of
section 301 of the 1974 Act. See 19 U.S.C. 99 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See generally

J.JACKSON & W. DAvEY,

J.JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra, at

§

10.5 (describing retaliatory actions possible under section

301). The trade laws were recently amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1107 (signed

on August 23, 1988).
The 1988 Omnibus Act made extensive changes to section 301 of the 1974 Act, in an
attempt to strengthen the U.S. response to certain foreign trade practices. See id. § 1301, 102
Stat. 1164-76. It also spelled out in more detail the protection conferred by section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, and it eliminated a requirement that the injured U.S. industry had to be
efficiently and economically operated. See id. § 1342, 102 Stat. 1212-16. Section 201 of the
1974 Act was rewritten to emphasize the process of adjustment to import competition. See id
§ 1401, 102 Stat. 1225-41. Finally, the 1988 Omnibus Act contained a number of"improvements" for the enforcement of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. See id. §§ 13111337, 102 Stat. 1184-1211. Although these amendments do not, for the most part, affect the
argument of this article, they are referred to below where pertinent.
5. See, e.g., Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An
Antitrust Perspective,56 ANTRrusT LJ. 409 (1987); Thomas R. Howell, ForeignCartels andAmerican Competitiveness, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE IAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE § 16 (1. Jackson, R. Cunningham & C. Fontheim eds. 1985); Daniel Oliver, Federal Trade Commission
Antitrust Policy in InternationalTrade, in UNITED STATES AND COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST POLiCIES 1 (B. Hawk ed. 1987);Jon Paugh, Antitrust Principlesand U.S. Trade Laws: A Review of Current Areas of Conflict, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 545, 562-610 (1980); Task Force Report on the
Interface between InternationalTrade Law and Policy and Competition Law and Policy, 56 ANrrruST
LJ.463 (1987); A. Paul Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the InconsistenciesBe Resolved? 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 339 (1983). But see Barbara Epstein, The Illusory Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust, 18 ANTIrrRusT BuLL. 1 (1973) (arguing that dumping occurs mainly

when the exporting country has internal restraints on trade and antidumping laws thus serve
as extensions of antitrust laws); Jeffrey L. Snyder, InternationalCompetition: Toward a Normative
Theory of United States Antitrust Law and Policy, 3 B.U. INT'L LJ.257, 309-16 (1985) (arguing that

trade regulation should focus on competition rather than troubled industries, by emphasizing
adjustment assistance as the remedy for fairly traded imports and aggressively "blocking"
unfair imports, with bilateral agreements that cement an international competition regime).
6. Paula Stem, New Directionsfor the Trade Laws, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 709,
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Underlying this statement are two fundamental premises about the
trade statutes: first, that there are such things as "unfairly" traded
goods (primarily those that have been "dumped" or "subsidized"), and
second, that producer welfare may take precedence over consumer welfare if producers have suffered from unfair trade. For the sake of argument, this article will accept Stem's first premise. 7 The second
premise, however, is far too simplistic. How readily should we, or must
we, sacrifice consumer welfare in the name of producer welfare? When
should we conclude that producers have been injured in the legal sense
by unfair competition, and when should we conclude that they simply
lost the competitive battle or were forced to abandon monopoly pricing
(also undoubtedly an "injury")? Not only are the answers to these
questions largely missing in conventional writing about the trade laws,
but the questions themselves have been ignored.
In this article, I suggest a new way of viewing the injury requirement
in our two principal unfair trade laws: the sections of the Tariff Act
authorizing antidumping and countervailing duties. The proposed system respects the congressional decision that dumping and subsidization are unfair methods of trade and also interprets the injury
requirement in both statutes in an economically reasonable way. I draw
freely on antitrust thinking; many of these issues have been closely
scrutinized in the antitrust and industrial organization literature. Without in any way denying that there is some tension between the trade
statutes and the antitrust statutes, I argue that the conflicts need not be
as great as some writers imply. The insights that originally appeared in
antitrust theory would improve the administration of the existing unfair
trade laws by striking a better balance between the protection of legitimate producer interests and the enhancement of consumer welfare.
713 (1985). See also the court's discussion of this point in USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F.
Supp. 60, 67, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1016, 1021 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
7. There is widespread political consensus that certain international trade practices are
unfair, though there is little economic consensus supporting that proposition. The contents
of the recently passed 1988 Omnibus Act demonstrate the strength of the political support for
the unfair trade laws. See Paul Dymock & Donna Vogt, ProtectionistPressuresin the U.S. Congress,
17J. WORLD TRADE L. 496 (1983). I accept the premise of unfair trade for a practical reason:
I think it unlikely to the vanishing point that the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
will be repealed any time soon. This does not mean, however, that the laws must be administered in the most economically foolish way. As others have recognized, much can and should
be done to rationalize enforcement. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 5; Douglas E. Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 57 Am'rrusT .J. 485 (1988). This
article points out some significant steps that can be taken. I should note, however, that many
people go further and argue that nothing short of repeal can cure the problems with the
antidumping and the countervailing duty laws. See, e.g., JohnJ. Barcel6 III, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties andAntidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 257, 281, 286 (1980);
JohnJ. Barcel6 III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 1 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STruD.
53 (1979); Wesley K. Caine, A Casefor Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930, 13 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681 (1981); George Kleinfeld, A CriticalEvaluation of U.S.
Fair Trade Policy, 18 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1985); J.A. Ordover, A.O. Sykes & R.D.
Willig, Unfair InternationalTrade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. ITr'L L. & POL. 323 (1983); Alan 0.
Sykes, CountervailingDuty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 CoLUm. L. REv. 199 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1155 1988-1989

1156

STANFORD LAW REVIEW
II.

[Vol. 41:1153

THE ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS

The most important statutes addressing unfair trade are the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which are concerned respectively with international price discrimination and foreign government
subsidization. 8 Other statutes exist that are more frankly protectionist;
they limit import competition for domestic producers without even the
justification that the foreign competitors are doing something wrong. 9
The terms of debate concerning protection from fairly traded imports
are understandably quite different from those concerning unfair trade.
Not surprisingly, more disruption to U.S. interests must be shown
before measures will be taken against fair trade, and a greater degree of
executive discretion tempers those laws even further. Unfair trade, in
contrast, is an easy target. The "playing field," one hears constantly,
should be "level." 1 0 The clear implication is that whenever something
that has been dubbed an "unfair trade practice" is occurring, a country
is justified-perhaps even compelled-to take measures against that
practice. In this part of the article, I review briefly the history of the
United States antidumping and countervailing duty laws, to set in context the conventional assumption that dumping and subsidization are
unfair practices, and to highlight the role that injury to U.S. industry
has played in the administration of the laws.
A.

The Statutes
1. The Antidumping Act of 1921.

Between 1921 and 1979, the principal U.S. statute directed against
international price discrimination was the Antidumping Act of 1921.11
8. See note 4 supra. Private parties may also use the Revenue Act of 1916 to challenge
dumping. See 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982). The 1988 Omnibus Act amended sections 337 and 337a
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) to
eliminate the requirement that the complaining firm must prove that it was efficient. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1342, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1212. For discussion of these and other more specialized
laws concerned with unfair trade, see generallyJ.JAcKSON & W. DAvEY, supra note 4, at § 10.4.
9. E.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (the
escape clause); id. § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982) (the market disruption provisions).
10. See, e.g., JOHN H. BARTON & BART S. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT.
REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BusINESS 168 (1986); HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY POLICY REFORM ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 40,
100th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 467 (1987) (dissenting views of Hon. Philip Crane).
11. Pub. L. No. 67-I, ch. 14, tit. 11, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-171 (1976) (repealed 1979)). The Revenue Act of 1916 was of course on the books,
but it was seldom used. It provides in part that
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any articles
from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to
import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States at a
price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the
country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported after adding to such market value or wholesale price, freight, duty,
and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the importation and sale
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It was directed against the practice of selling goods in the United States
market at a price lower than in the home market, known as selling for
less than fair value ("LTFV"). The statute did not require that the U.S.
selling price fall below any commonly accepted measure of cost. The
1921 Act provided only for an administrative remedy against proven
price discrimination, in the form of a tariff in the amount of the "margin of dumping" that the Department of the Treasury determined to
exist. The margin was defined as the difference between the foreign
manufacturer's price for home sales and its price for U.S. sales, measured on an exfactory basis in the home market and adjusted as required
for differences in circumstances of sale and the like. It was not enough,
however, to prove that dumping was taking place and to demonstrate
by what margin. The Treasury also had to find that a U.S. industry was
being or was likely to be injured, or was prevented from being established, by reason of the importation into the United States of the unfairly traded goods.
The 1921 Act reflected a general international consensus that
dumping was an unfair trade practice. In 1947, this consensus was
codified in Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), which forthrightly states that:
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products
of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the terparty or materially retards the establishment of a
ritory of a contracting
2
domestic industry.'
Article VI goes on to elaborate on the meaning of "less than the normal
value" and to state that countries are entitled to impose offsetting tariffs on dumped products. Later efforts in the GATT, including the
1967 Antidumping Code and the 1979 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, have carried forward the notion that dumping is an
unfair practice while also trying to prevent the abuse of antidumping
duties as unjustifiable impediments to international trade.' 3
thereof in the United States; Provided,That such act or acts be done with the intent
of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any
part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982). The need to prove what amounts to predatory pricing and the high
standard of harm have made the law nearly a dead letter. For a discussion ofthe 1916 Act, see
Kermit W. Almstedt, InternationalPrice Discriminationand the 1916 Antidumping Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1981).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 194 (effectiveJan. 1, 1948), as amended, T.I.A.S.
No. 1890 at 5 [hereinafter GATT]. For a general discussion of the practice of dumping, see
JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT ch. 16 (1969); JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923).
13. The 1967 Antidumping Code, although adopted by the Contracting Parties to the
GATT, was never fully embraced by U.S. trade authorities. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, July 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
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The Trade Agreements Act of 1979

As part of its overall effort to implement in U.S. domestic law the
results of the 1979 Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which comprehensively revised the laws regulating dumping.' 4 The 1979 Act added
a new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930, Subtitle B of which concerned
the imposition of antidumping duties. Like the 1921 Act, Title VII(B)
requires the administering authority to find that "a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at
less than its fair value."' 5 An LTFV sale exists whenever the foreign
market value exceeds the U.S. price for the merchandise. Since 1979,
the administering authority has been the Department of Commerce,
whose International Trade Administration is responsible for both the
antidumping and the countervailing duty laws. Title VII(B) also requires a finding of injury to the affected U.S. industry, but unlike the
1921 Act, which did not further define the term "injury," Title VII(B)
calls for a determination by the independent International Trade Commission (ITC) that:
(A) an industry in the United States(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially
retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of
sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation
16

4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, GATT BISD Supp. (No. 15), at 24 (1968). On the U.S. position, see
Robert E. Hudec, United States Compliance with the 1967 GATTAntidumping Code, 1 MICH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 205 (1979).
The 1979 Antidumping Code is formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919,
T.I.A.S. No. 9650, GATT BISD Supp. (No. 26), at 171 (1980).
14. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2,Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 147-48
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982)). The 1979 Act specifically provides that "the Congress
approves the trade agreements described in subsection (c) submitted to the Congress on June
19, 1979." 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a). The subsection (c) list includes, inter alia, the 1979 Antidumping Code and the 1979 Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code.
The 1979 Act has been discussed widely. See, e.g., Peter D. Ehrenhaft & Charlotte G.
Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Small Aid for Trade?, 58 TULANE L. REv. 1107
(1984); Terrence Roche Murphy, Antidumping and CountervailingDuties Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 14 INT'L LAw. 203 (1980). See generally JOHN JACKSON,
JEAN-VICTOR Louis & Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC
CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

§§ 7.4-7.6 (2d ed. 1983).

The 1979 Act has itself been amended substantially on two occasions, first by the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.), and then by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §§ 1311-1337,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1184-1211.
15. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 731(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1673(l) (1982).
16. Id. § 731(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). The
language following the phrase "by reason of imports of that merchandise" was added by the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 602(b), Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3024.
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Without an ITC finding of material injury, threat of material injury, or
material retardation of establishment, no antidumping duty may be
imposed.
Material injury is defined in the statute as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant."' 7 The definitional section
then continues with exhaustive instructions on what the ITC must consider as it attempts to implement this rather circular standard,' 8 which
was expanded in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.' 9
The most important distinction in the statute is that between actual
material injury and the threat of material injury. In cases of actual material injury, the Commission is directed to consider the volume of the
subject imports, the effect of the imports on prices in the United States
for like products, and the impact of the imports on domestic producers
of like products, "but only in the context of production operations
within the United States."' 20 The Commission may also consider other
factors, if it identifies them and explains their relevance. As the Commission evaluates volume effects, it must decide whether the volume of
imports or any increase in that volume (either absolute or relative) is
significant. With respect to price, it must consider whether the import
prices have been set at levels significantly below the prices of the comparable U.S. products, 2 ' and whether the imports have significantly depressed U.S. prices or prevented price increases. Finally, in examining
17. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 771(7), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1982).
18. For discussion of issues relating to determinations of material injury and threat of
material injury, see, e.g., Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series # 8:
Recent Developments Regarding Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Injury Determinations,20 Iscr'L
LAW. 689 (1986); Paul W. Jameson, Recent International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the
MaterialInjury Standard-A Critique, 18 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 517 (1986); N. David Palmeter,
Injury Determinationsin Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Cases-A Commentary on U.S. Practice,
21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 7 (1987); William E. Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the
United States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INV'L LJ. 345 (1985); Michael S. Knoll, An
Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury Under the United States Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Law (Nov. 2, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
19. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1328, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWs (102 Stat.) 1205-06 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1677(7)(B), (C)). The amended statute makes it clear that the enumerated factors must be
considered by the Commission, both by deleting language indicating that they were simply
"among other factors" and by adding a requirement that the Commission explain its analysis
of each factor listed under clause (i) of section 771(7)(B) (i.e. volume of imports, effect of
imports on prices in the United States, and impact on domestic producers). The amended
statute has new language permitting the Commission to consider other factors, in section
771(7)(B)(ii). The Commission is required to identify each additional factor considered and
to explain in full its relevance to the determination.
The 1988 Omnibus Act also adds a new factor to section 771(7)(C) that the Commission
must take into account in assessing the impact of imports on the domestic industry. New
subpart (IV) lists the "actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more
advanced version of the like product."
20. See id. § 1328(1), 102 Stat. 1205.
21. See id § 1328(2), 102 Stat. 1205 (changing the terminology for price effects from
"price undercutting" to "price underselling").
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the impact of the imports on the affected industry, the Commission
must "evaluate all relevant economic factors which have a bearing on
the state of the industry in the United States." The statute specifically
mentions "actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share,
profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity," "factors affecting domestic prices," "actual and potential negative
effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to
raise capital, and investment," and "actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced
version of the like product."'2 2 For cases involving a threat of material
injury, a special list of nine factors was added to the statute in 1984 and
1988.23 The separate list supplements the ordinary indicia of injury
because threat cases require a prediction about the industry's future
precisely when the normal factors do not indicate injury.
Finally, since 1984 the Commission has been required by statute to
"cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports from two or
more countries of like products subject to investigation." 24 The Commission looks at a variety of factors in performing this task, including
the degree of fungibility of the products, common or similar channels
of distribution, whether the prices of the imports and the domestic
product are within a reasonable range, and whether the imports are
simultaneously present in the market. 25 Notably, fairly traded imports
22. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 §§ 771(7)(A)-(C), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(A)-(C)
(1982) (as amended by the 1988 Omnibus Act § 1328, 102 Stat. 1205-06).
23. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 612(F), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (Supp. IV 1986);
1988 Omnibus Act § 1326, 102 Stat. 1204 (adding factor nine to the list that follows). The
Commission was directed to consider these factors, "among other relevant economic factors,"
in any threat of material injury case. The factors are: (1) the nature of any subsidy involved,
and whether it is inconsistent with the 1979 Subsidies Code; (2) increases in productive capacity, or unused capacity, in the exporting country, likely to result in significant increases of
imports to the United States; (3) rapid increases in U.S. market penetration; (4) the
probability that imports will have "a depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices";
(5) substantial increases in inventories in the United States; (6) the presence of underutilized
capacity in the exporting country; (7) "any other demonstrable adverse trends" indicating
likelihood of actual injury; (8) the potential for product-shifting from products either subject
to antidumping or countervailing duties, or under investigation, to the products under investigation, and (9) in investigations involving both raw agricultural products and processed
products, the likelihood that there will be increased product shifting if there is an affirmative
injury finding for one industry but not the other.
24. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986) (added by the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984 § 612(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3033). The 1988 Omnibus Act, § 1330, 102
Stat. 1206-07, added language making it clear that the investigations of the products could be
under either the countervailing duty laws or the antidumping laws; there is no need to match
dumped goods from Country A to dumped goods from Country B. Cumulation is required if
an antidumping investigation of widgets from Country A is taking place at the same time as a
countervailing duty or an antidumping investigation of widgets from Country B is taking
place, subject only to the Commission's power to disregard imports that are "negligible and
have no discernable adverse impact on the domestic industry."
25. See, e.g., Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, Taiwan, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 1742, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-251-253 (Preliminary) (Aug. 1985) &
USITC Pub. 1839, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-271-274 (Final) (Apr. 1986); Certain Steel Wire Nails
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do not in theory enter the calculus. 26
In assessing actual fact situations under the statute, most members
of the Commission follow a two-step procedure: Step one involves deciding whether or not the U.S. industry is experiencing material injury,
and step two asks whether that injury is caused by the unfairly traded
imports. 2 7 It is therefore possible to say that healthy U.S. industries
rarely, if ever, succeed in persuading the Commission to make an affirmative finding of injury, even if they might have been even more robust without the import competition. On the other hand, factors such
as declining production figures, plant closings, declining capacity utiliworkers are typical indicia of an induszation, and reduced demand for
'
try suffering "material injury. "28
In general, it is not too difficult to identify distressed industries using these criteria. The Commission's difficulties, and the disagreements among the Commissioners themselves, have arisen over the way
in which causation must (or can) be demonstrated. One approach is
simply to look at all the factors, such as the overall volume of imports,
concrete evidence that the unfairly traded imports have "undersold"
the competing U.S. products, the trend in import penetration, and the
temporal relationship between the economic condition of the U.S. industry and import movements. Even these factors, however, can be
misleading. For example, while a high volume of dumped imports may
appear to be strong evidence of the necessary link, the converse is not
true: In some industries, an apparently small volume of imports may
have a significant impact. 2 9 Lost sales evidence is rarely collected with
scientific rigor, and there are obvious difficulties in resting findings on
anecdotal evidence.
from the People's Republic of China, Poland, and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 1730, Inv. Nos.
731-TA-266-268 (Preliminary) (July 1985).
26. This is clear from the Court of International Trade's decision in USX Corp. v.
United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 72, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1016, 1026 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988), in
which the court had to determine "when may imports be considered 'unfairly traded' so that
they may be considered as candidates for cumulation analysis?" The court's discussion makes
it clear that fairly traded imports may not be the basis of a finding of injury.
27. See, e.g., Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub. 2033, Inv. No.

731-TA-354 (Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1374, 1378-80 (Nov. 1987); Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Canada and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1865, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-255 (Final) & 731 TA276, -277 (Final), 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1051 (June 1986). But see id. at 1054 n.18 (noting Chairwoman Stem's disagreement with the separation of injury and causation); Additional Views of
Chairwoman Stem in Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies Thereof from Japan,
USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207 (Final), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1223, 1231 (Dec. 1985).
28. See, e.g., Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel, USITC Pub. 2000, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-286 (Final) & 731-TA-365, -366 (Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1029 (Aug. 1987);
Malleable Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Thailand, USITC Pub. 2004, Inv. No. 731-TA-348
(Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1037 (Aug. 1987); Photo Albums and Filler Pages from Hong
Kong and Korea, USITC Pub. 1784, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-240, -241 (Final), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1217 (Dec. 1985); Choline Chloride from Canada, USITC Pub. 1595, Inv. No. 731-TA-155
(Final), 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1273 (Oct. 1984).
29. See Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Belgium and Israel, 10 I.T.R.D. at 1035 (citing
the legislative history of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act).

HeinOnline -- 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 1988-1989

1162

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1153

For these and related reasons, some Commissioners have experimented in recent years with a more structured approach to causation.
In Certain Red Raspberriesfrom Canada,30 then Vice Chairman Liebeler
proposed a five-factor test to be used in all cases. The factors were
(1) large and increasing market share of imports, (2) high dumping
margins, (3) homogenous products, (4) declining prices, and (5) barriers to entry to other foreign producers, or low elasticity of supply of
other imports. The stronger the evidence of those five conditions, the
more likely an affirmative determination would be made. The test was
developed on the assumption that "[t]he focus of the causation analysis
must be on whether the material injury suffered by a domestic industry
is by reason of price discrimination." 3' This, in turn, she assumed
meant some form of predatory pricing-that is, pricing below the foreign producer's cost of production.
The Red Raspberries test has not fared well before the Court of International Trade, which hears appeals from the ITC's decisions. It sustained one negative determination of injury in which the test had been
used on the express understanding that Commissioner Liebeler had
not "substituted these five factors for those which are enumerated at
§ 1677(7)."32 In USX Corp. v. United States, however, the court found
that the five-factor test was inconsistent with the statute. 3 3 It particularly rejected the idea that the antidumping law must be understood
purely as a price discrimination statute, and therefore as a law prohibiting only, below-cost foreign sales. Political forces might cause foreign
firms consistently to price their products for the U.S. market at a low
but remunerative level, serving goals like full employment. The court
found that Congress intended to address injury caused by these
34
dumped imports, as well as any imports sold below cost.

Other efforts to use more sophisticated economic analysis have met
with mixed success. In principle, elasticity analysis should be particularly helpfil in determining how sensitive U.S. prices are to various
volumes of imports. Elasticity of demand refers to the amount by
which demand for a product would change if there is a small (e.g., one
percent) change in price.3 5 In the case of some goods, a small difference in price would not cause people to change their buying patterns30. USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (Final), 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969, 1974 (June
1985). See also Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan, USITC Pub. 2020, Inv. No. 731-TA-343
(Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1241, 1247 (Sept. 1987) (views of Chairman Liebeler).
31. Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, 7 I.T.R.D. at 1973.
32. Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 567-68, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
2610, 2622 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
33. See USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 68, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1016, 1022
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
34. See id; see also Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1569, 1573-74 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988).
35. For an explanation of the economic concept of elasticity, see, for example, RtcHARDq
A. POSNER AND FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTrrRusT: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER

MATERIALS, app. at 1056 (2d ed. 1981) (appendix by W. Landes).
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in other words, demand is relatively inelastic. It is unlikely that slightly
lower priced imports of a good for which demand is inelastic would
cause material injury to a U.S. industry. On the other hand, if demand
is highly elastic, then even a small margin of dumping might have a
great impact on the U.S. producers, as customers flock to the lowerpriced imports.
In Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Board v. United States, the Court of
International Trade allowed the Commission to use elasticity estimates
because it was satisfied that the economic data were sufficiently reliable.a6 In USX, however, it rejected the Commission's effort to rest a
negative injury determination on outdated estimates of the elasticity of
demand for all steel products.3 7 Although the court did not say so explicitly, it may have been influenced by the ex parte nature of the Commission's estimate in USX, as compared with the adversarial testing of
the data that occured in Alberta Pork.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in minute
detail the Commission's injury decisions, several points from these
cases are important. First, any injury test that is adopted must consider
injury from the standpoint of U.S. producers. Tests such as the Red
Raspberriesfive-factor approach, which rely on the intent and cost structures of foreign producers and disregard the U.S. industry, go beyond
the permissible scope of statutory interpretation. Second, experience
with elasticity analysis gives reason to hope that an economically sound
approach that respects the statutory limitations would be accepted by
the courts. The approach to the injury determination set forth in this
article was designed with these limitations and possibilities in mind.
Only a few additional points about the current U.S. antidumping
law require attention at this point.3 8 First, the statute does not penalize
dumping in a strict liability sense. Some kind of injury to a U.S. industry is a prerequisite to the imposition of the duty, and that injury must
occur "by reason of" the imports or the sales for importation. Second,
the meaning of all these terms-injury, materiality, "by reason of'"-is
unclear. Neither the statute, the regulations, nor the decided cases give
much guidance on how to weigh the myriad factors the Commission is
36. Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 445, 9 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1129, 1142 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
37. USX Corp., 682 F. Supp. at 69-70, 10 I.T.R.D. at 1023.
38. There are many good general discussions of the ways that these laws operate. On
the subject of the antidumping laws, see generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 4; J.
VINER, supra note 12; WILLIAM A. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY (1977); Charlene Barshefsky & Richard 0. Cunningham, The Prosecution of An-

tidumping Actions under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 307
(1981); Bruce A. Ortwine, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and
After the TradeAgreements Act of.1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076 (1981) (student author). On the
subject of subsidies and countervailing duties, see generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER &JOANNA
SHELTON-ERa, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1984); Donald E. deKieffer, When, Why,
and How To Bring a CountervailingDuty Proceeding:A Complainant'sPerspective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
CoMM. REG. 363 (1981); Sykes, supra note 7.
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directed to consider. No acceptable framework, economic or otherwise, has yet been developed that tells courts or commissioners what
39
overall policy will resolve doubtful cases.
3.

The countervailing duty laws.

The importance of the injury requirement is illustrated more dramatically in the history of the countervailing duty laws. U.S. law prior
to the GATT, and indeed prior to a 1975 GATT amendment, provided
that if another country had paid a "bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export" of any dutiable product, then upon the
importation of that article into the United States, the Secretary of the
Treasury was to assess and collect a countervailing duty equal to the
amount of the bounty or grant. 40 No finding of injury to the competing
U.S. industry was necessary; the U.S. government's countervailing duty
simply offset another government's distortion of international trade
through the bounty or grant.
Until 1947, other countries could do little about the absence of the
injury requirement. The GATT, however, stipulated that no contracting party could levy either antidumping or countervailing duties
"unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as
the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an
established domestic industry, or is such as to prevent or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry." 41 Because of a grandfather clause in the protocol through which the GATT became effective,
the United States was not required immediately to make its countervailing duty law conform with this provision. 4 2 Changes or amendments of laws not compatible with the GATT were, however, required
to comply.
For this reason, when the United States began imposing countervailing duties against nondutiable subsidized imports in 1975, it added
an injury requirement to its laws. 4 3 More importantly, Congress also

comprehensively reworked the U.S. countervailing duty regime when it
implemented the 1979 Tokyo Round agreements. For countries either
willing to sign the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
39. In a sense, the situation is even worse: Conflicting frameworks exist. On the one
side, a great deal of legislative history and statutory evidence supports the proposition that
the antidumping act is protectionist-to help out U.S. industry no matter what the cost. On
the other hand, the whole point of the 1979 Act was to implement the Tokyo Round agreements, the purpose of which was to facilitate free international trade and to reduce all kinds of
tariff and nontariff barriers. Under the circumstances, it is understandably difficult for the
ITC to know what bias it should bring to its task-the protectionist's or the free trader's.
40. Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
41. GAIT, supra note 12, at art. VI(5).
42. Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5-6. A2051, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 2041, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
43. Trade Act of 1974 § 331, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)).
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Trade (known as the Subsidies Code) or willing to undertake equivalent
obligations, the new statute introduced an injury test, in Title I, Subtitle
A of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act. 4 4 No countervailing duty may be
imposed on products from these countries unless the Commerce Department concludes that the product is benefiting from a subsidy (direct or indirect) and the ITC determines that an industry in the United
States is materially injured, an industry is threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by reason of imports or sales for importation of the subsidized
merchandise. 4 5 Countervailing duties may still be imposed upon a simple showing of prohibited bounties or grants for merchandise not
46
originating in the specified countries.
The International Trade Commission does not distinguish between
the injury test applicable to antidumping cases and the test applicable
to countervailing duty cases, for the simple reason that the statute itself
prescribes the same rules for both. 4 7 Thus, one often sees cases claiming that imports from certain countries both enjoyed countervailable
subsidies and were being dumped. 48 The Court of International
Trade's decision in Hercules, Inc. v. United States,4 9 an appeal that raised
challenges to findings of injury caused by dumped and subsidized industrial nitrocellulose from France, exhaustively reviewed the Commission's injury findings in the countervailing duty investigation, and then
incorporated that discussion by reference for the antidumping portion
of the decision. 50 Similarly, in National Pork Producers Council v. United
States,5 ' a case brought exclusively under the countervailing duty laws,
the court upheld a Commission determination of no injury, indicating
that the Commission had not committed the error for which it had been
criticized in an earlier decision in USX v. United States,5 2 (an exclusive
44. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Title I Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 151 (codified

at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982)) (implementing the multilateral Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD Supp. (No. 26), at 56
(1980)).
45. See id.
46. Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). Section 303 will not be discussed
further, since the absence of an injury requirement renders it irrelevant to this article.
47. See Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 701(a)(2), 731(2), 771(7), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2),
1677(7) (1982).
48. See, e.g., Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from Korea and Japan, USITC Pub.
1848, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-248 (Final) & 731-TA-259, -260 (Final), 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1012 (May
1986); Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, People's Republic of China & Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1911, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-265 & 731-TA-297, -298, & -299 (Final), 9 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1587 (Nov. 1986); Welded Steel Wire Fabric from Italy, Mexico and Venezuela, USITC
Pub. 1795, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-261(A), -263(A), -264(A) (Preliminary), & 731-TA-289(A)291(A) (Preliminary), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1537 (Jan. 1986) (example of finding of no injury).
49. 673 F. Supp. 454, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1472 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
50. See id, 9 I.T.R.D. at 1491-96 (countervailing duty injury analysis) & 1497 (antidumping injury analysis).
51. 661 F. Supp. 633, 8 I.T.R.D.(BNA) 2428, 2433 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
52. 655 F. Supp. 487, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1979 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).

HeinOnline -- 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1165 1988-1989

1166

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1153

antidumping case) of relying exclusively on a low level of import
penetration.
Thus, the lessons one can glean from practice under the antidumping duty laws-that a predatory pricing standard for injury is unacceptable for the present statutes, that the Commission may rely on
economic tests such as an elasticity analysis if its approach is adequately
verified, and that it otherwise looks at all the factors outlined in the
statute without any systematic weighting of one over another-apply
with equal force to the countervailing duty injury standard. In theory at
least, U.S. consumers may now enjoy the lower prices made possible by
foreign governmental subsidies, as well as those made possible by price
discriminating foreign manufacturers, unless either practice inflicts too
much harm on domestic producers. The GATT Contracting Parties
and the U.S. Congress all understood that adding an injury requirement to the countervailing duty law would be a trade-enhancing mea-sure. They expected that at the margin fewer countervailing duties
could be imposed, since the duties would no longer be authorized
degree of injury
when domestic industry had not suffered the minimum
53
required by the Subsidies Code and Title VII(A).
For the United States to implement that understanding, and to fashion predictable and sensible countervailing duty and antidumping laws,
we need a clearer understanding of the kind and extent of injury that
should justify imposing the duties. As a first approximation, it seems
reasonable to require that the injury be of the type the trade laws were
intended to prevent and that it flow from that which makes the foreign
party's conduct unlawful-either the dumping or the subsidization. In
other words, not all injuries that would not have occurred "but for" the
unfairly traded imports should be redressable under these statutes.
Only those that are connected to the unfair aspect of the dumping or
subsidization should lead to tariff relief. This formulation will be familiar to an antitrust lawyer, since it paraphrases the famous "antitrust injury" test of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.54 With this
53. Recent experience shows that parties are indeed interested in whether an injury requirement applies to a particular country. The cases concerning application of the injury
requirement to Mexico clearly indicate that both the subsidizing country and the affected U.S.
industry understand that the injury requirement will result in fewer countervailing duties, at
the margin. See, e.g., Cementos Guadalajara, S.A. v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 335, 10
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1147 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Gementos Anahuac del Golfo, S.A. v. United
States, 689 F. Supp. 1191, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1402 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). Cf Meg Roggensack, United States CountervailingDuty Law as Applied to Mexico: The Need for a MaterialInjury Test,
18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 183 (1984) (student author) (showing that before injury
test became applicable to Mexico, U.S. imposition of countervailing duties against Mexico was
erratic and contrary to the interests of both countries).
54. 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986). Originally, the antitrust injury concept was used to deny recovery for economic damage resulting from an antitrust violation, when such a recovery would be perverse-that is,
would award lost monopoly profits. In time, the concept came to mean that injury to a particular competitor from a violation would not justify a recovery, unless overall competition in the
market was also adversely affected. For commentary on the antitrust concept, see, e.g., Wil-
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general approach in mind, I turn to an examination of the reasons for
condemning dumping and subsidization and the reasons for including
an injury requirement in both statutes.
B. How Injury Relates to the Unfairness of Trade Practices
Notwithstanding the fact of international consensus, it is not intuitively obvious why either dumping or subsidization ought to be
branded "unfair." Since the scope of the injury that should be legally
recognized depends in significant part on the scope of the underlying
problem that is being addressed, it is worthwhile to take a quick look at
how dumping or subsidization might be considered an unfair method
of competition.
Under the widely accepted theory of comparative advantage, the
world as a whole benefits from free trade. 55 Each country should produce what it can make at a relatively lower cost and trade some of its
excess production for goods that are relatively more expensive for it to
make. The differences in comparative costs that exist among countries
occur both because of differences in factor endowments (capital, labor,
land, etc.) and because of specialization choices. Whatever the reason
for the differences, international trade benefits all participants. Each
imported good frees up resources in the importing country that would
otherwise have been needed for the good's production. Those resources can now be devoted to some other kind of production, and the
"ipie" increases for everyone.
Most defenders of antidumping and antisubsidy measures would
concede everything in the preceding paragraph, with a few important
qualifications. The model works, they urge, only if all countries operate
under a market economy that accurately prices factor endowments and
only if perfectly competitive conditions assure that the most efficient
producers all over the world are the ones supplying the market. Introduce complications such as state-controlled economies, monopoly
power in one country's market, or protectionist measures that make it
easy for a country to export huge quantities and bar imports, and the
model collapses. 56 The free trade model is equally flawed if governliam H. Page, Antitrust Damagesand Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Ci.
L, REV. 467 (1980).
55. See, e.g., RICHARD E. CAVES & RONALD W. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS ch. 2
(4th ed. 1985); H. ROBERT HELLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
197-200 (2d ed. 1973); PETER LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMics chs. 2-3 (7th ed. 1982). These and other economic texts are, however, careful to point out
the limiting assumptions that are necessary prerequisites to true "free" trade, and to point out
that the distribution of gains from trade to specific countries or to specific producers will
depend upon variables such as the terms of trade, mobility of factors of production, and initial
factor endowments. These qualifications explain the skepticism expressed by some about the
wisdom of a free trade policy. See, e.g., John M. Culbertson, The Folly of Free Trade, HARV. Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 122.
56. The dependence of the classic theory of international trade on perfectly competitive
industries is reflected, among other places, in H.R. HELLER, supra note 55, at 5-6. Problems of
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ment regulation affects factor pricing-that is, if a government chooses
to subsidize certain factors (such as research and development, labor,
or interest costs) to give an artificial advantage to its industries. 57 In
the case of dumping, it is some degree of monopoly power in the home
market, coupled with legal or practical barriers to arbitrage and greater
foreign elasticity of demand than home elasticity, that make it possible
to charge a lower price in the export market. 58 In the case of subsidies,
the government has distorted the "natural" comparative advantages
that would prevail among countries and seized an "artificial" advantage
for its home industries.
These arguments, however, do not refute the fact that the importing
country receiving cheaper goods still enjoys a wealth increase, as long
as the benefits from the cheap goods are greater than the adjustment
costs for displaced industries and workers. The wealth increase is independent of the reason for the low import prices; imports may be
cheap because of extraordinary efficiency in the foreign plants or because of so-called cross-market subsidization made possible by price
discrimination. 59 The importing country would have reason to be conoligopoly and monopoly power are referred to in R. CAVES & R.JoNES, supra note 55, at 17275; Caves and Jones also allude to the problems of unreliable pricing that occur with
nonmarket economy countries, id at 274. For a general critique of the argument for free
trade, see John M. Culbertson, A Realist View of InternationalTrade and National Trade Policy, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1119 (1986).
57. See note 56 supra.
58. The so-called persistent dumper will have all these traits. First, the legal or practical
barriers to arbitrage will prevent the lower-priced goods sold in the foreign market from returning to the home market and eventually creating one price level. In other words, the home
and foreign markets must be economically segregated. Second, low elasticity of demand for

the firm's product means consumers see few substitutes for that firm's product, which implies
that the firm has market power at home. Acting rationally, the firm will naturally charge a
high price to exploit this market power. If foreign consumers had the same low elasticity of
demand, the firm would charge a high price abroad as well, which would not create a dumping
situation. Only if the elasticity of demand is high abroad-that is, if foreign consumers perceive many acceptable substitutes for the firm's product-will the firm set lower prices for
foreign sales. Indeed, the firm has no choice in the matter if it is to participate effectively in
the foreign market, because the high elasticity implies that consumers would simply choose
not to buy its product at the higher price. The economics of dumping are explained in R.
CAVES & R. JoNES, supra note 55, at 175-77. See also W. WARES, supra note 38, at ch. 2.

59. Cross-market subsidization refers to a firm's ability to charge lower prices in the
foreign market because of its high monopoly prices at home. Thus, for example, the American television producers who sued the Japanese producers argued that the low U.S. prices for
Japanese televisions could not have existed without the protected Japanese market. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 (1986). Most economists view
this theory as inaccurate. Dam, for example, offers the following criticism:
Sometimes this incongruous concern for the fortunes of domestic producers is based
upon the common fallacy that the foreign high price somehow facilitates the low
price on imports. The foreign producer is viewed as raising the price in his home
market to "subsidize" the low price abroad. This subsidization theory overlooks the
foreign producer's incentive to maximize his profits at home by charging an optimum price at all times there; the optimum price at home is, of course, unrelated to
the prices charged on his export sales.
KENNETH DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 169 (1970).
Andreas F. Lowenfeld makes much the same point in Fairor Unfair Trade: Does It Matter? 13
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cerned only if successful long-term predatory pricing were possible,
and if the low import prices were designed to last only long enough to
drive out domestic competitors. 60 Even the defenders of strict unfair
trade laws do not rely heavily on this scenario of predatory pricing,
however; it seems very unlikely. 6 ' If dumping and subsidization are unfair practices, their unfairness must depend on something other than an
overall detriment to the importing country.
Two other possible reasons remain for condemning dumping and
subsidization. The first reason is a somewhat imperialistic one. Assuming that U.S. antidumping and countervailing laws make foreign laws
that facilitate price discrimination or that confer subsidies less effective,
foreign governments may be induced to abandon these practices and
make their own markets more freely competitive. 6 2 Under this view,
the unfair trade laws are basically a foreign policy instrument, designed
to reduce this type of competitive pressure on U.S. industries.
The imperialistic justification for branding dumping and subsidization as unfair must be rejected for two reasons. One practical objection
is that countries generally have not adopted or rejected tariffs, subsidies, or other measures affecting their international trade solely to
please a particularly powerful trading nation. To take a current example, subsidies affect virtually all international trade in agricultural commodities. There is little doubt that these subsidies are wasteful and that
all countries would be better off if they could be abandoned. 63 The
CORNELL INT'L LJ. 205, 206 (1980). See also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 593, 595-97 (discussing
relationship between high domestic prices and low foreign prices).
60. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the only time a country need be concerned with dumping is when it is an instrument for predatory pricing. See Barcel6, The AntidumpingLaw: Repeal It or Revise It, supra note 7, at 64-66. He then argues that there are better
vehicles for attacking predation, principally the antitrust laws and secondarily the 1916 Antidumping Act, and that the general antidumping law should be repealed. ld at 66-69.
61. Predatory pricing can be defined roughly as the practice of selling goods below some
economically reasonable measure of cost in order to drive out a rival and ultimately control
the market oneself. It requires that the predator be able to finance the below-cost sales campaign long enough to eliminate the rival, and it requires entry barriers sufficiently high to
prevent new firms from entering to replace the target. Without those entry barriers, the
predator would never be able to reap the benefits of its campaign. Today's antitrust literature
is replete with discussions of predatory pricing, most of which argue that price predation is
rare and, when present, unlikely to succeed. See, e.g., 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
710-715
(1978);Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, PredatoryPricing:Competing Economic Theories andthe
Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738 (1981); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CuI. L. REv. 263 (1981); Paul G. Joskow & Alvin K.
Klevorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE LJ. 213 (1979). The
Supreme Court adopted an exceedingly skeptical attitude about the practice in Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 574, although it has been unwilling to eliminate predatory pricing altogether as a
theory that would support an antitrust recovery. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 117 n.2 (1986).
62. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 9-13; Bart S. Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United
States: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 5 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 144-47 (1973).
63. As the Ministerial Declaration on the 1986 Uruguay Round announced, "Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability
to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions including
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U.S. proposal to phase out such subsidies by the year 2000, however,
has received little more than a polite nod.64 When the United States
threatened to impose countervailing duties on pasta from the European
Economic Community (the "E.C."), the E.C. did not apologize for its
preexisting policies; it threatened an unspecified retaliatory measure. 65
Retaliation-not acquiescence-is the predictable reaction by other
countries when an internal policy is attacked or undermined.
The other objection to the imperialistic justification is the fundamental reality that the United States does not have the power to ban
dumping and subsidization directly. Because of the constraints of international jurisdiction, most of the arrangements that are targeted by
antidumping or countervailing duties are clearly beyond the direct
scope of U.S. regulation. Thus, the most that the duties can do is to
contribute to the persuasiveness of diplomatic efforts to urge another
country to change its behavior. Yet the insult to a co-equal sovereign
that a coercive effort to change a system of economic regulation implies
is likely to be counterproductive. Other kinds of efforts are much more
likely to effectuate a change, such as the issuance of agreed guidelines
within an organization (like the GATT or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)), multilaterally agreed
principles negotiated by the United Nations or the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or bilateral
66
negotiations.
those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability
in world agricultural markets." 25 Ir'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1623, 1626 (1986). It then specifically urges "increased discipline" on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies. Id. For a
general description of the Uruguay Round agenda, see The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade-Decisionson Negotiating Structure and Plansfor the Uruguay Round, 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 850 (1987), reprinted in 29 HARV. INT'L I.J. 199 (1988).
64. After the formal commencement of the Uruguay Round, the United States proposed
a plan whereby all countries would eliminate their agricultural subsidies by the year 2000. See
All Farm Subsidies Would End by Year 2000 Under U.S. ProposalSubmitted to GATT Talks, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 860 (1987); Major FarmingNationsApplaud U.S. Subsidy Reform Plan, Yet Question Its Feasibility, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 861 (1987); United States ProposalforNegotiations on

Agriculture, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 884 (1987). To date, there appears to be little likelihood
of the plan's adoption.
65. See, e.g., 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 843, 926, 978, 1227 (1987) (various articles
describing some of the moves and countermoves in the long-running U.S.-E.C. pasta dispute).
For the agreement that resolved a dispute concerning U.S. citrus exports to the E.G., in which
the U.S. retaliated against an alleged lack of market access for its citrus fruit exports by imposing duties on a variety of products from the E.C. (including anchovies, various cheeses, olive

oil, and olives), see EC Moves to Drop Trade Restrictions on U.S. Citrus and Walnuts as Pasta Dispute

Settled, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1024 (1986). The 1988 Act should resolve both of these
disputes. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1122, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1143-46 (a statutory implementation of the
U.S.-E.C. agreement on citrus and pasta).

66. See, e.g., note 63 supra (the GATT Uruguay Round); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (rev. ed. 1984); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Second
Revised Decision of the Council on the Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THE 1984 REVIEW OF THE 1976 DECLARATION AND
DECISIONS 11 (1984); U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), SET OF MULTILAT-
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Finally, in considering the imperialistic justification, it should be
noted that the justification is a smokescreen. The political pressure
favoring unfair trade statutes comes from interest groups seeking protection from low-priced foreign competition in the U.S. market.6 7 The
reason for the low prices, one suspects, is of little interest to these interest groups. 68 Rational U.S. policy, however, should not condemn
dumping and subsidies merely at the behest of these interest groups.
Rejection of the imperialistic justification leaves a second possible
reason for condemning dumping and subsidization. This reason is that
firms should be required to compete against only the natural advantages that foreign firms enjoy, not against artificial advantages like governmentally protected monopoly power or public subsidies. The
argument goes that the most "naturally" efficient firm should win the
competitive battle, not the firm whose efficiency is dependent on a
boost from its government. Over the long run, worldwide allocations
of resources would be optimized if "real" efficiency, not artificially induced advantages, determined success in the marketplace. Since an importing country cannot compel a separate sovereign to abandon public
policies like high tariff walls or governmental subsidies, the second-best
solution is to neutralize the exporting country's policies6 9by eliminating
the advantage its firms enjoy in the importer's market.
ERALLY AGREED EqUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS

PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev, U.N. Sales No. E.81.II.D.5 (1981); CanadaUnited States: Free-Trade Agreement, reprintedin 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 281 (1988);Japanese-United States Agreement on Semiconductor Trade, reprintedin 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1408 (1986).

67. Two authors suggest that the evidence shows that the industries pressing hardest for
import protection tend to be highly concentrated. See Walter Adams &Joel B. Dirlam, Dumping, Antitrust Policy, and Economic Power, Bus. ToPics 20 (Spring 1966). Adams later wrote an
article demonstrating the link between the non-import-related woes of the U.S. steel industry
and the industry's intensive effort to secure protectionist measures. See Walter Adams, Import
Restraints and IndustrialPerformance:The Dilemma of Protectionism, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
34 (1979).
68. Two examples of specific industries seeking relief from import competition of any
kind are the automobile industry's resort to the "escape clause" of section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974 and the existence of the worldwide textile cartel represented by the Muhifibre
Arrangement (MFA). The U.S. automobile industry tried strenuously to obtain relief from
import competition through the use of section 201, which, as noted above, presumes fairly
traded imports. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. But the International Trade Commission concluded that the industry's problems were not caused by imports and therefore it
was not eligible for relief. See Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, USITC Pub. 1110, Inv. No. TA-201-44, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5241 (Dec. 1980). In early
1981, the industry pressured Congress to pass import relief legislation. Eventually, trade relief was forthcoming in the form of a "voluntary restraint agreement" agreed to by the Japanese in mid-1981. For a detailed description of these events, see A. LOWENFELD, supra note
14, at §§ 8.1-8.4. The textile industry provides a similar example. The MFA is an umbrella
organization under which textile and clothing importers (such as the E.C., the U.S., and Canada) negotiate quotas with the exporting countries to soften the impact of foreign competition
on the importing countries' industries. See Gary Sampson, Market Disturbancesand the Multifibre
Arrangement, in IssuEs IN WORLD TRADE POLICY: GAT AT THE CROSSROADS 61 (R. Snape ed.

1986). In short, the sole purpose of the MFA is to keep low-priced, fairly traded textiles out
of the importing countries.
69. This argument is spelled out in deKieffer, supra note 38.
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I shall assume for purposes of the rest of this article that the unfair
trade laws are designed to neutralize artificial economic advantages.
This is the only goal that is simultaneously consistent with Congress's
insistence that these laws are not purely protectionist and with the obvious purpose of the laws to nullify a defined set of foreign practices.
While, from an academic standpoint, it is easy to show that the line
between artificial and natural advantage is elusive at best, it is nonetheless possible to identify subsidies and price discrimination as indicative
of imperfectly competitive markets. The present statutes characterize
those causes or symptoms of imperfect competition as "unfair." Without a complete overhaul of the statutory system (in a direction at odds
with the 1988 revisions), it seems best to attempt to give the most economically sensible content to the structure we have.
The artificial advantages argument outlined above relies, albeit imperfectly, on an efficiency-based approach. Logically, this argument
concedes that there is nothing unfair about a U.S. firm's loss of business to a more efficient foreign competitor. Furthermore, this conclusion, should hold even if that foreign competitor is receiving
governmental subsidies or if it is engaging in price discrimination, as
long as the "unfair" practices do not change the firm's efficiency or
70
make the dispositive difference in the competitive battle.
From this viewpoint, the fundamental problem with the unfair trade
practices addressed in the antidumping and countervailing duty laws is
that the practices of price discrimination and subsidization allegedly
distort comparative economic advantages between nations. 7 1 Accord70. It is important to note that this point is at best controversial under present law.
There has been debate for many years over whether the ITC, in determining whether injury
exists, should look at the effect of the unfairly traded imports on the U.S. industry, or if it
should look at the marginal effect of the unfair trade practice. In practical terms, this debate
has been translated into a question whether the level of subsidies or margin of dumping is
pertinent to the injury determination. See, e.g., Bello & Holmer, supra note 18, at 698. (To be
perfectly accurate, one would also need to know the elasticity of demand for the products in
question, since a one percent margin for a product with a high elasticity would be more competitively significant than the same one percent margin for a product with a low elasticity.)
The Court of International Trade held in Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp.
1237, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 293 (1985), that the ITC was not required to consider dumping margins in deciding whether injury existed. See also Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F.
Supp. 640, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 29 (1984) (dicta to same effect for subsidy cases). However, in
Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2610 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988), the court held that the ITC is permitted to consider margins as one relevant economic
factor. The relationship between margins analysis and the approach to injury suggested in
this article is explored below. See notes 109-112 infra and accompanying text. See generally N.
David Palmeter, CountervailingSubsidized Imports: The InternationalTrade Commission Goes Astray, 2
UCLA PAc. BASIN LJ. 1 (1983); Edward R. Easton & William C. Perry, The Causationof Material
Injury: Changes in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of the InternationalTrade
Commission, 2 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 35 (1983).

71. As indicated in notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text, dumping and subsidization
distort comparative advantage only if one draws a distinction between permissible advantages
and impermissible ones. For purposes of my argument, it is enough to accept the nonnormative proposition that subsidization and price discrimination can change the pre-existing advantages among countries.
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ing to the artificial advantages argument, firms are somehow entitled to
the advantages they derive from sources like historical specialization,
skills in the workforce, supply of laborers, natural resource endowments, and technological developments, but they are not entitled to advantages derived from targeted favorable tax laws, interest-free loans
from the government, subsidized export credits, high tariff walls
preventing competitive imports, or state-conferred monopolies. The
problem of drawing a line between "natural" and "artificial" advantages should be obvious from the foregoing list, but I shall assume
again for the sake of argument that a meaningful distinction can be
made between the two kinds of advantage. 7 2 This distinction, however
inelegant it seems, is forced on us by the existing legislation. In a perfect world, under this approach, efficient firms in countries with relatively lower comparative costs will tend to export their products,
whereas relatively inefficient firms in countries with higher comparative
costs will tend to have their production replaced by imports.
The conception of unfairness on which this model rests underlies
the approach that I shall take as to the kind of injury that should give
rise to relief. As I explain below, the injury that should be legally recognized is the injury suffered because the practice in question causes
lost market share or sales to a competitively structured industry. If the
competing foreign firm is more efficient, adjusting for any advantage
conferred by the unfair trade practice, or if the U.S. industry does not
conform roughly to the model of a competitive (and hence efficient)
market, a closer look at the injury suffered is required. Only the injury
that corresponds to the loss that a competitive industry would suffer
should be recognized-should "count" toward satisfaction of the injury
73
requirement in the statutes.
72. Perhaps the best distinction would be between differences arising out ofgovernmental interference in the economy and differences that are independent of governmental action
( e. "free market" advantages). The only problem with such a purist approach is that it would
not correspond to the understandings that underlie the trade laws. Technological development, for example, is facilitated by laws that protect intellectual property. A country with
highly advanced technologies may have a comparative advantage in that sector because its
laws have encouraged innovation. Technology, therefore, would be considered an artificial
advantage under the purist approach, not a natural advantage. Most people, however, assume
that technology is a natural, or "legitimate," advantage, and view only the more obvious governmental actions as artificial.
73. This is slightly different from saying that the industry in the United States must
prove that it is efficiently and economically operated, as was required for recovery under section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 until the passage of the 1988 Omnibus Act. See note 8 supra.
My argument would allow for recovery even by an inefficient industry, though only to the
extent that its losses would have been felt by a competitively structured industry. Furthermore, my proposed approach does not require courts to examine foreign producers to see if
they are engaging in predatory acts. As the Court of International Trade recognized recently,
the statutes as written do not include such a requirement. See USX Corp. v. United States, 682
F. Supp. 60, 68, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1016, 1022 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). The point in the text is
also different from the old "technical dumping" argument. Technical dumping was said to
exist when the foreign firm was simply meeting U.S. prices. See note 122 infra. Under my
system, the unfairly trading foreign firm's ability to undercut U.S. prices without incurring
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PROPOSED APPROACH TO DETERMINING INJURY

The ITC should be required to find injury only when a competitively pricing industry would have suffered from the unfair trade practice. Unlike physical injury, "injury" in the economic sense cannot be
described in the abstract. As we know from the Brunswick case in antitrust, it is not enough to prove an unlawful act and to prove in a "but
for" sense that a firm has suffered from that act.74 Statutes regulating
competition must be more precise. Every indicium of injury mentioned
in the unfair trade statutes is ambiguous because it may stem from
healthy and fair competition or it may stem from predatory or unfair
competition.
Heretical as it may sound to mainstream trade lawyers, every
"pinch" due to dumping or subsidization should not automatically justify tariff relief. The statutes themselves do not permit the imposition
of duties every time a firm in an import-competing industry suffers financial reverses. On the contrary, the statutes require a finding that an
entire U.S. industry has been injured "by reason of" the unfairly traded
imports. To take this one step further, even when the injury was literally by reason of the unfairly traded imports (or better, the unfair trade
practice itself), relief should be granted only when the evil that the statutes are directed against is taking place. That evil I take to be the loss
that an efficient, competitively pricing U.S. industry would suffer when
either dumping or subsidization prevent it from successfully operating
in the market. Nothing in either the trade statutes or in any underlying
economic rationale requires the assumption that injury must always be
measured against the status quo, no matter how monopolistic and inefficient it may be. Tariff relief should not be ordered when the effect of
the unfairly traded imports is simply to force monopoly price levels in
the U.S. market down to more competitive rates.
The proposed approach requires three basic inquiries, which combine the questions of injury and causation. First, the group of like
products must be identified. This ought to be, although it is not at
present, equivalent to an antitrust product market determination. Second, the firms in the market must be identified, including domestic
firms, fairly trading foreign firms, and unfairly trading foreign firms. 75
Two evaluations of market structure can then be undertaken: (1) How
concentrated is the market as a whole? and (2) Does the U.S. industry
antidumping or countervailing duties would depend upon the competitive structure of the
U.S. industry. See notes 95-128 infra and accompanying text.
74. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
75. The necessity of identifying all unfairly trading foreign firms makes this approach
compatible with the cumulation requirement that Congress imposed in the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984, § 612(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3033 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)
(Supp. IV 1986)), and expanded upon in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 § 1330, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1206-

07.
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portion of the market have the ability to exercise market power? Third,
the Commission must determine whether the U.S. industry has suffered
the kind of injury that warrants tariff relief by looking at whether the
unfair trade practice itself has given the foreign firms any advantage. If
the unfair trade practice has only forced a U.S. industry with market
power to behave competitively, relief should be denied; if it has forced
(or threatens to force) prices below the U.S. industry's marginal costs,
relief is warranted.
The basic data needed to implement this approach is already available to the ITC under the present statutes, although it is likely as a
political matter that my proposed approach would require such a significant reorientation of the statutes that legislative action would be appropriate. Assuming that carefully tailored statutory changes could be
made, there are several such changes which could even more precisely
tailor the fit between the economic objections to dumping and subsidi76
zation and the unfair trade remedies.
A.

Industry Definition
As with the antitrust laws, the first step in determining whether injury exists under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws is to
define the affected industry. The statute defines the term "industry" as
"the domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that product ...

A

"like product," in turn, is defined as "a product which is like, or in the
absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article
subject to an investigation under this title." 7 8 The ITC has no coherent, predictable approach to industry definition. 79 The most that can
be said is that the Commission begins with the question of which products are "like," and after delineating the product market it identifies the
U.S. producers of those products. Foreign producers who are trading
fairly, as well as foreign producers who are under investigation, are excluded from consideration at this stage.
The ITC's approach to the critical problem of identifying "like"
products seems to focus on demand-related factors, rather than the
ease with which other suppliers could enter a market. However, in a
recent decision concerning seven different kinds of cut flowers, the
Court of International Trade disparaged the probative value of evi76. See notes 142-151 infra and accompanying text.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986) (special rule for wine and grape products
deleted). Note also that regional industries may be isolated when certain criteria are satisfied:
The producers within the region must sell almost all of their production there, and demand
must not be supplied by producers located elsewhere in the United States. See id
§ 1677(4)(C) (1982). Regional market analysis is not particularly important to my thesis;
where it makes a difference, I so indicate.
78. Id. § 1677(10) (1982).
79. For criticism of ITC practice, see, e.g., Palmeter, supra note 18.
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dence of substitution by ultimate consumers for the determination of
whether or not products are "like" for purposes of the statute.8 0 One
commentator claims that the only consistency in the Commission's determinations is, reminiscent ofJustice Potter Stewart's immortal remark
about some antitrust cases, that the petitioner almost always wins.8 1
The cited examples are compelling: Galvanized carbon steel sheet is
not "like" ungalvanized carbon steel sheet, but galvanized carbon steel
wire nails are "like" ungalvanized carbon steel wire nails; welded pipe
is not "like" seamless pipe except in oil industry uses.8 2 In a November
1986 decision concerning porcelain-on-steel cooking ware, the Commission concluded that all such cooking ware-skillets, frying pans,
sauce pans, roasters, and teakettles-were "like products." 8 3 Two
months later, in January 1987, the Commission was faced with complaints concerning top-of-the-stove stainless steel cooking ware. There
it found "one like product consisting of all top-of-the-stove stainless
steel cooking ware, excluding teakettles, ovenware, and kitchen
ware." 8 4 Why the teakettles were so different in the two cases, not to
mention why cooking ware made of other materials was consistently
excluded, was not adequately explored.
In other instances, the Commission defines markets that appear remarkably narrow to readers accustomed to product market definition in
antitrust cases. For example, one countervailing duty case defined a
domestic industry made up of shop towel producers. Shop towels are
cloths used for wiping and cleaning functions in industrial and commercial establishments. Entry into this market would probably be quite
easy, since it appears to require only access to cotton or cotton-acrylic
blend fabric and the necessary finishing equipment. Nevertheless, this
industry convinced the ITC that it was injured by imports subsidized by
Pakistan.8 5 In another case, the Commission decided that the "like
product" was "red raspberries packed in bulk containers for sale to
80. Specifically, the court stated "[i]f one has to choose a single basis upon which to
make a like product determination, consumer preference would seem to be a poor choice."
Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1165, 1168
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). The debate was over whether there were seven "like products" represented by standard carnations, miniature carnations, standard chrysanthemums, pompon
chrysanthemums, alstromeria, gerberas, and gypsophilia, or whether all cut flowers were the
"like products." The Commission had split on the issue, with those favoring seven industries
in the majority. But see Certain Spirits from Ireland, USITC Pub. 1165, Inv. No. 104-TAA-3, 3
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1040, 1042 (July 1981) (finding one industry for liqueurs rather than a different one for each type of cordial).
81. Palmeter, supra note 18, at 15-16.
82. Id at 15.
83. See Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, People's Republic of China &
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1911, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-265 & 731-TA-297, -298, & -299 (Final), 9
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1587, 1590 (Nov. 1986).
84. Top-of-the-Stove Cooking Ware from Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-267, -268 (Final), & 731-TA-304, -305 (Final), 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1768, 1770
(Jan. 1987).
85. Cotton Shop Towels from Pakistan, USITC Pub. 1490, Inv. No. 701-TA-202 (Final),
6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1494 (Feb. 1984).
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remanufacturers," and it excluded all other types of berries,8 6fresh-market red raspberries, and retail/institutional packed berries.
The Commission might argue that it actually follows a clear test,
under which it looks at the interchangeability of use between the imported product and similar domestic products, at demand shifts as
prices change between the two (i.e., cross-elasticity of demand), and at
the ability of suppliers to shift their production as prices change (i.e.,
supply elasticity). 8 7 The only problem is that the Commission has no
general standard against which it measures the results of its inquiry.
For any statute in which it is necessary to define a relevant market or
the industry producing a like product, one must know where to draw
the line: How much interchangeability of use is enough to group two
products together? The answer to this question is critically important
to anyone who wants meaningful protection for an industry faced with
unfair dumping or subsidization. If the industry is defined very narrowly to encompass only the firms producing an identical product, then
it may be easier for firms to demonstrate injury. On the other hand, the
price of such a narrow definition is ease of evasion: If consumers consider some non-identical products to be acceptable substitutes, then an
antidumping or countervailing duty will have no effect on the health of
the industry, because consumers will simply switch to the substitute
product. Instead of losing sales to the identical imported product, the
U.S. firms will lose sales to the substitute product. If, on the other
hand, the industry is defined very broadly, through broad definitions of
"like products," then the opposite problem is raised. Since injury to
one or to a few firms in a multiple firm industry will not satisfy the
standard in the unfair trade laws, a broad market definition will make it
harder to prove injury to the industry as a whole.8 8 As more firms producing a wider variety of products are included in the industry definition, the odds increase that many of them will not be injured from the
86. Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (Final), 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969, 1970 (June 1985).
87. See, e.g., Certain Steel Wire Nails from China, USITC Pub. 1842, Inv. No. 731-TA266, 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2165 (May 1986); Natural Bristle Paint Brushes from China, USITC
Pub. 1805, Inv. No. 731-TA-244 (Final), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1529, 1530-32 (Jan. 1986); Radial
Ply Tires for Passenger Cars from Korea, USITC Pub. 1572, Inv. No. 731-TA-200 (Preliminary), 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2389, 2390-91 (Sept. 1984). The leading antitrust case applying the
cross-elasticity of demand test is still United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours (Cellophane
Case), 351 U.S. 377, 393-404 (1956). See also Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 32528 (1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 273-77
(1964).
88. In one case, for instance, the Commission employed a broad market definition of
"frozen french fried potatoes," rather than one which would have excluded french fries sold
to fast food chains and to retail supermarket chains. In addition, the Commission rejected an
assertion that a regional industry existed, and instead based its analysis on the entire United
States. The Commission found no injury to the industry as defined thus. See Frozen French
Fried Potatoes from Canada, USITC Pub. 1259, Inv. No. 731-TA-93 (Preliminary), 4 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1393 (June 1982). See also Sodium Hydroxide-West Germany, USITC Pub. 1040, Inv.
Nos. 731-TA-8, -9, -10, & -11 (Preliminary), 1 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5240 (Feb. 1980) (only one
complaining firm, not joined by others in industry).
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import competition.8 9

Since the ultimate injury determination will depend on the scope of
the "like product" definition found by the Commission, the first step
the Commission can take toward improving the predictability and economic accuracy of its decisions is in refining its market definition process. Because the statute requires it to identify only the U.S. producers
of the like products, the ITC is free to disregard other foreign sources
and competitive products.9 0 It should first define the products that are
"like" the one that is being sold at less than fair value, or that is being
subsidized, and then identify the U.S. producers who make this product
(or occasionally, who are seeking to enter the industry). To do this, the
Commission must find a test that will provide an economically and thus
practically meaningful answer to the question of what kinds of similar
characteristics and uses must exist before other products will be
deemed to be "like" the import at issue.
The best-known such test at present can be found in the Department of Justice's product market definition rules in its 1984 Merger
Guidelines, as elaborated and applied to non-merger cases in the Department's revised Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations.9 1
By asking, as the Merger Guidelines-do, what products are so closely related that a hypothetical monopolist could successfully raise prices,
without either causing consumers to switch to substitutes or inducing
entry from other suppliers in a relatively short period of time, one can
determine which products should be grouped together.9 2 In a practical
sense, this information can be (and is) gathered by asking producers
which products they regard as competitive and by asking consumers
how they have reacted to actual price changes in the past. At least for
89. This phenomenon is difficult to document from the trade cases, because the Commission so rarely adopts an extremely broad market definition. It was clearly the effect, how-

ever, in the antitrust Cellophane case, in which the Court's decision to define a market as
"flexible wrapping materials" instead of as high-grade cellophane products resulted in a finding of lack of monopoly power. 351 U.S. at 377. More precise economic tests that take into
account the elasticity of demand for a product, supply substitution, and market shares for a
given defined market avoid the problem of product market manipulation. See, e.g., R. POSNER
& F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 35, at 347-354. The problem with the more rigorous tests lies
in the difficulty of obtaining accurate data on elasticities.
90. In an industry with three groups of competitors-the U.S. firms, the fairly trading
foreign firms, and the unfairly trading foreign firms-this focus on U.S. producers means that
the Commission may fail to identify acceptable substitutes being produced by the fairly trading foreign firms. The fairly trading foreign firms become relevant, however, when the Commission determines whether the alleged injury to the U.S. producers was "by reason of" the
unfairly traded imports.
91. ANTrTRusT DMSION,U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTIcE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), reprinted in

4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

13,103 (1984); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement

Guidelines for International Operations, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), Extra Ed., No. 24, Nov. 10,
1988.

92. In antitrust circles, this approach is a widely accepted way to define a relevant market. Professor Hovenkamp, for example, describes the same approach: "A relevant market is
the smallest market for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently low that a
firm with 1007o of that market could profitably reduce output and increase its price substantially." HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAW § 3.2, at 59 (1985).
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this purpose, the unfair trade statutes clearly have the same goal as the
antitrust laws: to determine which products are competing with the
products manufactured by the firms under investigation.
Another, less precise measure also exists for evaluating whether two
products are close substitutes. In antitrust case law, the courts frequently assess "cross-elasticity of demand" between a product and
other products with similar characteristics or uses. 93 To evaluate the
cross-elasticity between products A and B, we would ask how many consumers presently purchasing product A will tum to product B if the
price of A rises. The greater the cross-elasticity-that is, the more people that switch from A to B when a small price increase occurs-the
closer the two products are as substitutes. Cross-elasticity must be
used with care, however, because almost every good has substitutes if
its price soars to a high enough point. Cross-elasticity is thus a problematic measure when the question is whether a firm is presently monopolizing a relevant market. In order to use this measure accurately, it
would be necessary to estimate what the competitive price of each
product would be, and then to assess cross-elasticity-a task problematic enough that most courts do not attempt it.
The problems with cross-elasticity might be less important for trade
law purposes than they are for monopolization cases. Any substitution
between the domestic industry's products and the imported product
that is currently taking place is relevant, even if substitution is occurring only because the U.S. product is priced at monopoly levels. Nevertheless, given a choice between the traditional cross-elasticity approach
and the newer Merger Guidelines approach, the latter is preferable for the
trade statutes. The questions asked are similar-what substitutes exist,
how readily will consumers turn to them, at what prices do they become
attractive-but the Merger Guidelines give a greater sense of the boundary lines that ought to be drawn, which in the end is the most important
point.
Once the industry that produces the competitive products is identified, it becomes possible to discern whether the U.S. firms in the industry possess market power, either collectively or individually. In some
cases it is even possible to observe market power directly, through evidence about the performance of firms in the industry. 94 When a firm or
group of firms with market power complains about competition from
unfairly traded imports, the typical response of the trade laws has been
to treat this complaint just like all others. Such a response, however,
93. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours (Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. at
380-81, 399-401; EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 911 (1981); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531
F.2d 910, 918-19 (8th Cir. 1976).
94. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (noting that
"'proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output' can obviate the need for
an inquiry into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects.' ") (quoting 7
PHiLUP AREEDA, ANrrRus-r LAw
1511, at 429 (1986)).
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fails to take into account the fundamental reason why the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws exist, which appears to be to prevent efficient U.S. industries from being harmed by these kinds of imperfect
import competition. The basic policy question ought to be what trade
law response is appropriate in this kind of case, or, put differently, what
kind of injury ought to be sufficient to justify the tariff relief that the
statutes authorize.
At least two approaches are possible. First, one might refuse to consider the monopolized U.S. product as a "like" product, and thus exclude that producer and its alleged injuries from the trade proceeding.
The obvious problem with this solution is its counterfactual nature:
The monopolized U.S. product certainly belongs in the relevant market, and it makes little sense to exclude it artificially. Alternatively, one
could accept the "like product" definition at face value but refuse to
give relief for loss of monopoly power over price. This approach would
be easier to administer, since it permits reliance on actual evidence of
consumer behavior. It can only work, however, with the addition of the
next step I propose, which is designed to estimate the degree of market
power the U.S. firms in an industry can exercise.
B. Market Power Inquiry
Once the Commission has defined "like products" and can identify
the domestic producers of those products, the additional market power
step that I propose would be inserted. Unless direct evidence of market
power existed, this step would begin with the ITC's characterization of
the market structure of the industry. At this point, unlike the first-stage
identification of U.S. producers of the like product, the Commission
should include in the market all foreign firms. It should then identify
the proportion of that market held by U.S. firms and by foreign firms
that are not engaging in unfair trade practices. The fairly trading foreign firms should be included because the efficiency-based rationale of
the unfairness of dumping or subsidization implies that import competition from them is a legitimate part of the U.S. market. 9 5 The purpose
of this step is to arrive at a rough calculation of how competitively the
U.S. industry is behaving. More formally, its purpose is to determine
how likely it is that the prevailing prices charged by U.S. firms correspond to the ideal of competitive pricing.9 6
95. Notably, injury from such firms is not included in the mandatory cumulation provision of the statute, under which the Commission must cumulatively assess "the volume and
effect of imports from two or more countries of like products subject to investigation if such
imports compete with each other and with like products of the domestic industry in the
United States market." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
96. Under perfect competition, price will be equal to the industry's marginal cost of
production. See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 92, at § 1.1; R. POSNER & F. EAsTEaRBOOK,
supra note 35, app. at 1062-63 (appendix by W. Landes). As firms begin to acquire market
power, they begin to acquire the ability to price above their marginal cost. The monopolist
prices substantially above marginal cost, by limiting output to the point where its marginal
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At the two extremes, the Commission might find that there is only
one firm, from the United States, producing the like product, or that
there are a great number of small firms. In the former case, the market
is monopolistic, and it is reasonable to infer that the prices in the market either are anticompetitively high, or would be in the absence of the
unfairly traded imports.9 7 A monopolistic market, of course, is inefficient: Society bears a deadweight loss of some dimension, and wealth
is transferred from the rest of society to the monopolist, thereby diminishing the consumer surplus that would exist at competitive price
levels. At the other extreme-an atomistic U.S. market structure, taking into account both U.S. firms and foreign firms that are trading
fairly-it is reasonable to assume that prices are at competitive levels.9 8
The likelihood of inefficiency in the U.S. industry is quite low, because
any firm whose costs were too high to survive at the prevailing market
price would go out of business, and its output would easily be replaced
by the output of the remaining firms in the market. These results
would also obtain in a fully contestable market - one that was so easy
to enter that it would never be possible to sustain supracompetitive
prices over any significant period of time, because new entry would always force prices back down.9 9
Two intermediate kinds of market structure are also possible: oligopoly and monopolistic competition. In an oligopolistic market, the
number of sellers is small enough that each is consciously and perceptibly influenced in its price and output decisions by the actions of the
other. If effective cooperation is possible, oligopolistic industries will
tend to maximize the collective profits of each firm, by approaching the
monopoly price level.' 0 0 Under monopolistic competition, relatively
revenue will equal its marginal cost. At that point, due to the downward sloping demand
curve, consumers will pay a price above marginal cost. The problem is not so much to identify these ideal extremes as it is to ascertain where on the spectrum actual industries and firms
fall. For a discussion of some ofthe evidence that might be used, and its pitfalls, see PHILLIP
AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
128-130 (4th ed. 1988).
Marginal cost itself is a term that requires some definition, since short-run marginal cost

will tend to be lower than long-run marginal cost, in industries where fixed assets are replaced
over the longer run. Economic texts tend to look at the long run, in their descriptions of ideal
prices and output. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICs 216, 241-53 (6th ed. 1988);
F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MAREr STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 13-20 (2d ed.
1980). These cost figures are extremely difficult to calculate in practice, which is why a more
elaborate approach to the inquiry is almost always necessary in antitrust law, and will be
equally necessary here.
97. Formally, one would expect to find price at the point where the firm's marginal cost
of production equals its marginal revenue. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 96, at 12-13.
98. Scherer describes the conditions of a perfectly competitive market: homogeneity of
the product, insignificant size of individual sellers and buyers relative to their market, absence
of barriers to the entry of new firms, and mobility of resources employed or potentially employable in the industry. Id. at 11.
99. For a discussion of contestability, see WxLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLI, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
100. For a discussion of the economics of oligopoly, see F.M. SCHERER, supra note 96, at
chs. 5-8; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrrRuST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39-77 (1976).
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many small firms compete in the market for their general class of products, but the products themselves are differentiated. Product differentiation allows firms to affect price to some degree by their output
decisions-the less they produce, the more consumers will be willing to
pay for each unit.1 0 1 These intermediate kinds of market structures are
the most interesting for present purposes, since they best describe
most real-world situations.
Once the structure of a correctly defined market has been characterized, it becomes possible to determine whether firms within that market
are likely to be exercising market power over their pricing. In other
words, this step would allow the ITC to determine whether the particular U.S. industry in question is behaving competitively. Since the ITC
gathers information about the U.S. industry as a whole, including key
facts such as the number of firms in the market, sales figures, and capacity figures, it should be relatively easy for the Commission to come
to a judgment about market structure. The more difficult problem has
to do with the reliability of inferences about market performance from
market structure: Firms in contestable markets have little or no ability
to exercise market power, even though there may be only a few of
them. The best available way to address this problem is in the process
of market definition, by including as producers presently in the market
those who can enter quickly and easily. Another option would be to try
to assess market power on the basis of direct performance information,
such as profitability or rate of return data. Persistent rates of return
above those in comparable industries may indicate the presence of market power; again, this kind of data exists in published statistics, and it
can be gathered by the ITC during an investigation. I remain skeptical
about the reliability of profitability measures, however, given the difficulty of matching profits to particular product lines and the elusiveness
of the risk element.
This part of the injury test would not require the ITC to determine
10 2
what the firms in question were doing with their monopoly profits,
101. In other words, there is a downward-sloping demand curve for the firm's product.
To the extent that other firms in the broader market manufacture products that are acceptable
substitutes for the firm's product, the firm's power over price is reduced. An equation expressing the relationship between market power and market share helps to give an idea of this
interrelationship among the firms:
ed(f) = [ed(mk) + e,(1-S)] / S

where edco is the elasticity of demand facing the firm, ed(,k,) is the market elasticity of demand,
e, is the elasticity of supply of the firm's competitors, and S is the firm's market share. See R.
POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 35, at 352. The virtue of this equation is that it adjusts
automatically for how broadly or narrowly the market is defined, and thus the choice of market definition will not skew the ultimate determination of the firm's own market power. The
vice of the equation is simply that these figures are difficult to obtain in practice, particularly
within the time limits available to the ITC. For a description of rTC procedures, including the
strict statutory timetable, see Gary W. Horlick, Summary of Procedures under the United States Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 828 (1984).

102. Of course, if every firm in the U.S. industry were transfering its ability to earn extra
profits to its input suppliers, the marginal cost curve would be affected. In that case, it might
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nor would it need to engage in the difficult process of calculating marginal cost, or average variable cost. The goal, through whatever the
best mechanism proves to be, is to identify market power in the U.S.
industry. To the extent that market power can successfully be exercised, some deadweight loss can be predicted for the economy, along
with some transfer payments from consumers to the industry. With this
information in mind, we can turn to the effect that the unfairly traded
imports have on the industry, and to the central questions of whether
and to what extent that effect should qualify as legal injury.
C. Determination of Trade Injury
Under the artifical advantages rationale for condemning the practices of dumping and subsidization, injury suffered by a U.S. industry
that is inflicted by a more efficient foreign competitor (excluding the
effects of the price discrimination or the governmental largesse) should
not suffice to prove injury within the meaning of the statute. In addition, regardless of the efficiency of the foreign competitors, if the U.S.
industry's complaint in whole or in part rests on the loss of its ability to
exercise market power, then to that extent its injury claim should be
rejected.
1. More efficient foreign competitor.
If, after adjusting for the margin of dumping or subsidization, the
foreign firm would still have bested the U.S. firms in the marketplace, it
is reasonable to infer that the foreign firm is the more efficient competitor and is entitled to whatever market share it can capture. Thus, the
law should relate trade injury to the margin of dumping or subsidization that exists, to the effect on demand caused by that margin (i.e.,
elasticity of demand for the products), and to the overall level of import
penetration. Injury should not be found when the mere presence of
imports that have been either dumped or subsidized is all that can be
shown. 10 3 The statutes say that the injury must be "by reason of imports of that merchandise, or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of
sales) of that merchandise for importation." 10 4 A number of people
have argued that the plain meaning of this provision favors the more
protectionist approach-namely, that the existence of the unfairly
be true that the U.S. industry was uniformly selling at marginal cost. Although in principle
competitive pressures from foreign suppliers ought to force some trimming of those costs,
this situation would count as a "competitive" industry for my proposal. The key factor to look
for, in any case, is the ability to sell at a price above marginal cost.
103. As noted in note 70supra,the ITC and the courts appear at present to have rejected
this interpretation of the statutes. See Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp.
1237, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 293 (1985); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 8
Ct. Int'l Trade 29 (1984); Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 9 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 2610 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). See generally Bello & Holmer, supra note 18.
104. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 §§ 701(a)(2), 731(2), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2),
1673(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see text accompanying note 16 supra.
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traded import in the U.S. market constitutes the injury, whether the
margin of dumping or subsidization is one percent or one hundred percent. 10 5 It would also be possible, however, to read the statute in the
broader context of the international agreements regulating antidumping and countervailing duties, with an understanding of the overall economic effect of any additional tariff.
There are a number of problems with the literalistic, plain meaning
argument. First, it is inconsistent with the rationale underlying the
condemnation of dumping and subsidization-that these practices distort world markets and cause deviations from the production patterns
to which natural comparative advantage would otherwise lead. Second,
it probably conflicts with the 1979 Antidumping Code, adopted by the
10 6
United States and many other countries after the Tokyo Round.
Although Congress reserved the right to override the Codes in the implementing U.S. legislation, one should find that it did so only on the
basis of the clearest evidence.1 0 7 That kind of evidence is lacking
here.' 0 8 Third, to the extent that injury is easier to find when the margin of dumping or subsidization is ignored and duties are thus easier to
impose, an anti-consumer bias is introduced into the law. Even if anticonsumer measures may be necessary to protect local producers
105. See, e.g., CharlesJ. Goetz, Lloyd Granet, &Warren F. Schwartz, The Meaningof"Subsidy" and "Injury" in the CountervailingDuty Law, 6 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 17, 26-29 (1986);
Jameson, supra note 18, at 562-73; Palmeter, supra note 18; Perry, supra note 18; Cumulation of
Imports in Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Investigations, 17 GEO. WASH. J. IN'L L. & EcoN.

463, 479 (1983) (student author). As noted above, it is necessary to know the elasticity of
demand for the product before one can evaluate the effect of the dumping margin. See note
70 supra. Even one percent may be very significant if demand is highly elastic.
106. The Antidumping Code states that "[i]t must be demonstrated that the dumped
imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of this Code."
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 4927, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD Supp. (No. 26), at 174
(1980). Similarly, the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code states that "[it must be
demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of the subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement." Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31
U.S.T. 513, 528, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD Supp. (No. 26), at 65 (footnote omitted).
While this language may be slightly ambiguous in its references to the dumped or subsidized
imports, the references to the effects of the dumping or the subsidy provide stronger support
to the argument in the text than to the literal approach.
107. See generally RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 115(1)(a) (1988); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461,465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 931 (1973). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 2, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
147-48 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982).
108. Knoll argues forcefully that the evidence is clear that Congress intended to implement the Codes in the 1979 Act, and that it certainly did not intend to override them. See
Knoll, supra note 18, at Part IV. See also Peter D. Staple, Implementing "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standardin Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws, 32 STAN.L. Rnv. 1183

(1980) (student author). Jameson, while apparently opposed to my position, never argues
that Congress intended to flout the 1979 Codes in enacting the Trade Agreements Act. He
simply ignores the international background of the statute altogether. SeeJameson, supra note
18.
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against unfair distortions of international trade, it seems clear that consumers should not be penalized disproportionately.
The broader and more economically sophisticated interpretation of
the statute is usually referred to as "margins analysis." Using margins
analysis, the Commission would attempt to isolate the effect of the unfair trade practice on producers in the U.S., rather than the effect of all
products being sold by the unfairly trading producer. If the margin of
dumping or subsidization is very low, then all other things being equal
it is less likely that any injury suffered by the U.S. industry is due to the
unfair trade practice. Thus, the Commission would focus on the practice being attacked instead of on the simple fact of import competition,
some of which may be perfectly fair. The unfair trade practice will arguably cause the affected products to be priced lower than they otherwise would have been. The effect of that lower price, however, cannot
be predicted unless one has some idea of the elasticity of demand for
the product in the U.S. market. Where demand is inelastic (i.e. a small
change in price will have little effect on quantities demanded), any
given margin of dumping or subsidization will have a more injurious
effect on the U.S. industry, because of price depression unaccompanied
by any important increase in output. When demand is elastic, the same
lower price would lead to increased amounts demanded, and thus a
lesser degree of injury. One way, then, in which the Commission could
use evidence concerning margins is to eliminate cases where the small
size of the margins, in the light of demand elasticity, indicates that the
unfair trade practice could not have caused the injury to the U.S.
producers.109

The ITC also uses margins to compare the U.S. price of the imports
with the margin of dumping or subsidization. If, for example, the margin of dumping is ten percent, but the imported product's price is
twenty percent lower than the like U.S. product's price, margins analysis requires the conclusion that any injury suffered by the U.S. industry
could not have been "by reason of" the unfairly traded imports. 110
109. See, e.g., Heavy-Walled Rectangular Welded Pipes and Tubes from Canada, USITC
Pub. 1808, Inv. No. 731-TA-254 (Final), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1779, 1783 (Feb. 1986) (no injury
found where the weighted average dumping margin was 0.65% and where no other special
circumstances existed); Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, USITc Pub. 1707, Inv. No.
731-TA-196 (Final), 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1969, 1974 (June 1985) (setting forth five-factor test
for the injury determination, one factor of which is size of dumping margin). See also
Anhydyrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, USITC Pub. 1118, Inv. No. 731-TA-25 (Final),
2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5616, 5620 (Dec. 1980) (a majority of the Commission concluding that
amount by which imports "undersold" the domestic product was accounted for by the dumping margin). See also cases cited in note 70 supra.
110. See Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, 2 I.T.R.D. at 5620. As noted
above, the Commission must consider whether there has been significant price undercutting
by imports, which leads to the temptation to compare the price differences between imports
and domestic products with the margin of dumping or subsidization. See text accompanying
notes 18-23 supra.
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Even without the advantage of unfair trade practices, the importer
could still have undersold its U.S. competitors.
This use of margins analysis also has its flaws, however. It ignores
critical factors like the effect of product differentiation on pricing, the
ability of the foreign firms to meet the U.S. demand created by lower
prices, the elasticity of the U.S. demand itself in the relevant price
range, and the market share in the U.S. held by the imports in question.
In the example above, the ten percent lower price that we presume
would have existed in the absence of dumping may not have materially
affected the import market share. The injury to the U.S. industry may
have arisen only because of the additional reduction made possible by
the dumping. Every case will be different, of course. The important
point is that a superficial comparison of the margins of dumping or
subsidization and the U.S. price of imports is essentially uninformative.
If, however, upon a sufficiently sophisticated examination of the effects of the unfair trade practice, we can conclude that the practice did
not reverse the relative efficiency of the U.S. and the foreign industry,
there should be a finding of no injury."' Interestingly, the Treasury
Department went even further than this during the period when the
steel trigger price mechanism (TPM) was in effect. The trigger prices
were the prices at which different kinds of steel could be manufactured
in the world's most efficient facilities, which the Government decided
were located in Japan. 112 The Treasury Department promised to selfinitiate a dumping investigation if steel were imported into the country
at a lower price. Imports from other, less efficient, foreign countriessuch as those in the E.C.-could as a practical matter enter at the trigger price without risking an investigation. The Treasury Department
nevertheless refused to develop a two-tiered trigger price to prevent
dumping by European producers, in part because it refused to believe
that the U.S. industry could be injured by European sales at prices that
were legal for the Japanese. 1 3 Absent the special circumstances of the
TPM, however, the correct rule would focus on the competitive relationship between the U.S. industry and a particular foreign competitor
in the absence of unfair trade practices. If the marginal advantage conferred on foreign producers either because of the practice of dumping
or because of subsidies makes no difference to the competitive outcome, that should be the end of the Commission's inquiry. If the unfair
trade practice did make a difference, a more detailed examination of
111. See Knoll, supra note 18, at Part III.
112. See generallyJacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Trigger PriceMechanism: ProtectingCompetition or Competitors? 13 N.Y.U.J. Icr'L L. & POL. I (1980); Joseph Wedin, The Steel Trigger Price
Mechanism, 33 S.C.L. REV. 593 (1982) (student author); ProtectingSteel: Timefor a New Approach,
96 HAxv. L. REV. 866 (1983) (student author).
113. European imports of steel entered at the trigger price even though their costs exceeded the Japanese costs. See, e.g., J.JAcKsoN & W. DAVEY, supra note 4, at 717. See also A.
LOWENFELD, supra note 14, at § 6.2.
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the extent to which firms in the U.S. industry can exercise market
power ought to be the next step.
2. Market power of U.S. firns.
Whenever a market in the United States is less than perfectly competitive-which occurs almost all the time-the prevailing U.S. price
level will probably be above industry long-term marginal cost. For the
sake of simplicity, I shall first consider the limiting case where there
would be a single monopolist in the United States if the unfair foreign
competition were disregarded. I shall then consider lesser degrees of
market power, most of which arise from a form of tacit cooperation. 1 4
A U.S. monopolist, M, will attempt to charge a price for its product
that equates marginal cost and marginal revenue. 1 5 Until new entry is
attracted into that market, the monopolist will succeed in maintaining
this price. During the period of monopoly pricing, society as a whole
will incur a deadweight loss, and there will be a wealth transfer from
consumers to M. Suppose now that a hypothetical foreign firm, F,
wishes to enter the U.S. market with a competitive product that has
been subsidized by F's government. Suppose also that the product in
question is homogenous, that F can make no U.S. sales at any price
above M's price, and that F is unable to price below M without the benefit of the subsidy (thus indicating that F has failed the first screen). If F
refrains from selling in the United States, of course, then U.S. consumers will continue to pay monopoly prices to M. If, however, F takes
advantage of its subsidy and undercuts M's price, M will begin to lose
sales to F. M will experience some or all of the adverse effects mentioned in the countervailing duty law, such as decline in sales, market
share, profits, and capacity utilization. 1 6 M decides to file a countervailing duty petition with the Department of Commerce and the ITC,
complaining that F is the recipient of subsidies and that the domestic
industry-M itself-has been injured "by reason of" the subsidized
imports.
Assuming that the petition is facially sufficient, the ITC should
nonetheless reject this petition on injury grounds. The effect of the
imports from F is to drive M's former monopoly price down toward a
competitive price level. This effect is unambiguously good for U.S.
consumers, since it tends to eliminate the deadweight loss and lessen
the transfers of wealth from the consumers to M. The only question is
whether the U.S. government should intervene to cut off that consumer
114. Under the trade statutes, it is not necessary to find
the market participants. The problems that have arisen under
dealing with conscious parallelism, plus factors, the search for
dum, and the like, need not arise. See R. POSNER, supra note
EASTERBROOK, supra note 35, at 331-44.
115. See note 96 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 22 supra.

an actual "agreement" among
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the "smoking gun" memoran100, at ch. 4; R. POSNER & F.
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benefit in the interest of a greater good that can be conferred on M, the
U.S. producer. Using the efficiency-based artifical advantages argument for condemning the subsidies, the answer must be no.
There are only two potential greater goods that might be served by
intervening to help M. First, preventing F from competing in the
United States would help M retain its monopoly position in the U.S.
market. This alleged benefit is easy to reject: nothing in U.S. competition policy or trade policy expresses an interest in preserving M's monopoly rents. Quite to the contrary, there is a strong interest in
eliminating those rents, even if the competitive pressure that accomplishes this end comes from a foreign producer.
There is also a second potential benefit to intervention, one which is
more complicated to assess. By ensuring that M does not cede any
market share to F, the U.S. government ensures that M will not suffer
the potential costs of contracting its capacity. This alleged benefit is
illusory, however. To the extent that the subsidization or dumping is a
long-term phenomenon, society is probably better off adjusting to the
new allocation of resources.' 17 If entry and exit are relatively easy in
the affected industry, then adjustment costs are likely to be less than the
consumer benefits gained by more effective competition and lower
prices. In an industry where entry and exit are costly and time-consuming, the legal regime should certainly seek to minimize the costs of adjustment. The question is how to accomplish this. Are antidumping or
countervailing duty laws the best tools to use to facilitate adjustment,
or are other laws such as adjustment assistance and the escape clause
better? Unlike the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which
are premised on unfairness, the escape clause and the adjustment
assistance provisions are specifically designed to insulate U.S. competitors from excessive foreign competition, or to help U.S. workers adjust
to new competitive conditions. 118 Relief under the escape clause is
more difficult to obtain, however, in part because the injury requirement is much stricter and in part because executive discretion to deny
or fine-tune protection is far greater. 1 9
117. Most commentators today agree that dumping, at least, is likely to be a long-term
phenomenon. See W. WARES, supra note 38, at 7-12; Barcel6, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or
Revise It, supra note 7, at 60. Viner was more skeptical about the probability of dumping as a
long-term strategy. SeeJ. VINER, supra note 12, at 122-26. If the history of U.S. sugar subsidies is any measure, subsidies also may become politically entrenched, and thus may best be
considered long-term phenomena. See generally G. HUFBAUER &J. SHELTON-ERB, supra note 38.
118. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §§ 1421-1430, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 1242-57 (strengthening provisions for worker adjustment assistance) (amending 19 U.S.C. §3 2271-2397 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)); see also Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-225(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(escape clause), and the comprehensive amendment of that law in the 1988 Omnibus Act
§ 1401, 102 Stat. 1225-41.
119. The President's discretion is now spelled out in section 203 of the 1988 Omnibus
Act, 102 Stat. 1234-38. He may follow the ITC's recommended remedy; he may provide
alternative relief; or he may refuse to give any relief at all.
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Since there is no social benefit to be gained in the preservation of a
U.S. industry's monopoly rents, it is important to avoid an interpretation of the unfair trade laws that has the practical effect of rent preservation. In the antitrust field, courts reject a firm's claim when the gist
of its complaint is that it will lose its ability to charge high prices; the
claim is directly contrary to the purposes of the law. 120 The trade laws
can be applied in the same way, using evidence that the ITC already
has. This approach would go a long way toward harmonizing antitrust
policy and trade policy, and at the same time it would respect the congressional decision that efficient, competitively structured U.S. industries should not lose their advantage over foreign firms because of
artificial advantages enjoyed by their foreign competitors.
The approach which I propose avoids the perverse results that the
existing interpretation of the injury requirement brings about. Discussing the antidumping laws then prevailing, Kenneth Dam pointed out in
1970 that "the less efficient the local firms, or the greater their local
monopoly, the more easily the requisite injury can be shown (even
though the local consumer's need for the low-priced imports is comparatively greater."' 12 1 There is no reason why the trade laws should supply this kind of affirmative protection of market power, even if the
foreign firm happens to be engaging in price discrimination or enjoying
subsidies from its own government. In the example of M described
above, until F forces M's prices down to the point where M is setting
price equal to its marginal cost of production, M has not suffered the
kind of injury that should be redressable under the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws.
If F, however, succeeds in eventually forcing M to price at M's marginal cost, and F continues to underprice because of its unfair trade
practices, M's injury should be redressable. To the extent that M loses
market share to F solely because F is selling at LTFV or is enjoying
subsidies, an antidumping or countervailing duty would be appropriate. Market share information would again be useful, this time looking
at all firms in the market. If M's share drops so low in comparison to
the unfairly trading firms that an inference of market power is no
longer reasonable, there is no reason to suspect continuing monopoly
rents.
The question then becomes how to measure the duty. The statute
dictates that the duty must reflect the entire margin of dumping or subsidization, even though this measure often results in a price too high to
meet local competition in the United States.' 22 The better practice, if it
120. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
121. K. DAM, supra note 59, at 169.
122. There is no "meeting competition" defense under the trade laws, despite the fact
that this creates a lack of symmetry between the antidumping laws (international price discrimination) and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982) (domestic price discrimination). See Victor, supra note 5; Gary N. Horlick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy
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were feasible as a practical matter, would be to impose duties only to
the extent that the unfair practice enables the foreign firm to undercut
an efficient price level in the U.S. industry.
The approach I propose applies to the oligopolist as well as the monopolist. Suppose that instead of the single firm M in the U.S. industry,
we have a small group of firms G1, G2, ... , G,, that produces the kinds
of products and faces entry conditions that are conducive to oligopolistic behavior. This example introduces an additional complication, because of the way that the overall market is potentially divided among
domestic firms, fairly trading foreign firms, and unfairly trading foreign
firms. For simplicity, I begin with the assumptions that the oligopoly
presently controls 100% of the U.S. market, there are no fairly trading
foreign firms seeking to enter, and the unfairly trading foreign firm F is
trying to enter. Here again, the ideal approach would be to compute an
industry marginal cost and to deny trade relief for unfair practices that
simply drive U.S. prices down to the level of marginal cost. I discuss
below, in Part IV, ways in which this might be implemented as a practi23
cal matter.1
The history of the steel industry's use of the unfair trade statutes
illustrates the advantages of the proposed approach. The steel industry
historically exemplified an oligopolistic industry, in which prices apparently had risen to levels well above marginal cost. The high prices may
have been due in part to excessive payments for certain factors of production, particularly labor (i.e., higher costs), but the prices may also
have been due to an unwillingness to invest in new technologies at a
critical time, or to an ability to charge generous prices to direct purchasers such as the automobile companies.1 24 Whatever the reasons, it
is clear that the steel industry has been suffering for some time from
foreign competition. It is equally clear that the industry's problems
have not been alleviated by its long history of success in obtaining various kinds of trade protection-tariffs, orderly marketing agreements,
voluntary export restraints, and the present steel import stabilization
program.' 2 5 In fact, the import protection measures have imposed
Trade and U.S. Antidumping/CountervailingDuty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984). The Commission appears today to be less sympathetic to so-called "technical dumping" than it was in the
past. "Technical dumping" refers to the foreign producer's practice of charging a lower price
in the United States solely to match competitive prices in the United States. See S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1974); Peter D. Ehrenhaft, The 'Judicialization"of Trade Law, 56
NOTRE DAME LAw. 595, 604 (1981).
123. See text accompanying notes 130-141 infra.

124. Walter Adams has written over the years about the economic performance of the
steel industry. See Adams, supra note 67; see also A. LOWENFELD, supra note 14, at §§ 4, 5, 6,
8.5; John William Hargrove, The Steel Import Stabilization Act of 1984: Protectionism or Correctionism? 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 149 (1985) (student author); Protecting Steel: Time for a New
Approach, supra note 112.
125. The Steel Import Stabilization Act, which was part of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984, Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3043-47 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253
(Supp. IV 1986)), has provided the authority for an impressive network of bilateral quantitative restriction agreements between the United States and various steel exporting countries.
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high costs on consumers of steel (such as the U.S. auto industry and
manufacturers of consumer durable goods) and have simultaneously
retarded the industry's adjustment to stiff worldwide competition.
The steel industry's antidumping and countervailing duty petitions
should have been resolved by determining the amount by which the
industry prices were above the industry marginal cost. This approach
would have allowed legitimate competitive pressure to reduce prices to
marginal cost, and perhaps would have induced procompetitive reductions in costs that were excessively high as a result of sharing oligopoly
rents with suppliers of labor and other inputs. Only to the extent that
the unfairly traded steel was still undercutting the hypothetical competitive (i.e., marginal cost-based) U.S. price would a finding of trade injury
have been justified. Tariff relief would have been appropriate to redress that injury, measured by the amount necessary to bring foreign
126
prices up to the competitive U.S. price level.
Several further considerations arise if we suppose that some of the
competition in the U.S. market comes from fairly traded imports. In
this case, we might have a four-firm market in which firms GI and G2 are
U.S. firms, and firms G3 and G 4 are fairly trading foreign firms. Firm F
again is a non-U.S. firm engaging in LTFV sales or benefiting from subsidies. From the point of view of consumer welfare in the United
States, we still want to know if G1 through G4 are pricing competitively
or not. Oligopoly cooperation may well be more difficult if some firms
are located in other countries, with different languages, marketing
practices, price and delivery constraints, and the like. Nonetheless, the
empirical question is the same as it was when all the firms were U.S.based and foreigners had not yet entered the market: To what extent is
the status quo-excluding the effect of the unfair trade practice-one
that reflects some market power in U.S. price levels? As before, injury
to the U.S. producers should be recognized only to the extent that a
firm is unable to survive using marginal cost pricing.
It is important to note that evaluating the structure of the industry
may prove problematic. If the market is unconcentrated, it is safe to
presume that the prevailing price being charged by the U.S. firms cannot be significantly above marginal cost over the long run. 12 7 But as
On February 27, 1986, the United States Trade Representative announced that agreements
with the E.C. and 17 other countries were in force. See 51 Fed. Reg. 6965 (1986); see also note
124 supra.
126. An even more ambitious approach would be to compute a hypothetical competitive
level of costs for the U.S. industry, and then to derive the competitive price from it. This
approach, however, goes beyond the trade injury standard that I am proposing, and data
problems would render it far more difficult administratively.
127. One way that industry structure could be categorized would be to borrow the
thresholds established by the Department of Justice in its 1984 Merger Guidelines. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, is calculated by summing the squares of the individual
market shares of all the firms included in the relevant market (or, for trade law, of all firms
producing the "like product"). TheJustice Department offers several reasons why this is preferable to a simple computation of the market shares:
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the market becomes more concentrated, and as the share held by the
U.S. firms becomes higher, the U.S. firms are more likely to be able to
exercise market power.' 28 At that point, the problem should be treated
the same way as the first oligopoly situation I discussed.
Finally, assume that the U.S. firms and the fairly trading foreign
firms, taken together, occupy only a small percentage of the U.S. market. As noted above, if the foreign producers are more efficient than
the U.S. firms, disregarding the effects of the unfair practices, there
should be a finding of no injury. The U.S. firms are probably not

charging prices above their own costs, 1 29 so it is not difficult to identify

the "efficient" price level. That price can be computed as before, and
duties could be imposed on the dumped or subsidized goods as before.
Unfortunately, the greater the proportion of the U.S. market that is
served by the dumped or subsidized goods, the greater the loss in U.S.
consumer welfare when the low prices made possible by the unfair
practice are negated. A fourth step could therefore be added to the
trade injury determination: Tariff relief should be rejected whenever
consumer benefits, less any adjustment costs, outweigh producer
benefits.
This potential fourth step should be rejected, however, for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the comparative efficiency argument
that I have assumed to be the purpose of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Second, adoption of this step would be tantamount
to the repeal of both statutes. Short of repeal, the best compromise is
to follow the approach I have outlined above. First, define "like products" in an economically meaningful way. Second, ascertain the structure of the product market that has been defined. Finally, determine
whether any injury has been suffered because of the unfair trade practice. To the extent that the unfair practice has influenced the level of
the foreign firms' participation in the U.S. market, and to the extent
that the U.S. industry is behaving competitively (i.e., following a standard of marginal cost pricing), tariff relief should be awarded.
Unlike the traditional four-firm concentration ratio, the HHI reflects both the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of the market
outside the top four firms. It also gives proportionately greater weight to the market
shares of the larger firms, which probably accords with their relative importance in
any collusive interaction.
ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 91, at § 3.1. A
variant of my proposal using HHIs is described in Part IV as a way that this approach to injury
could be implemented without undue administrative burden. See text accompanying notes
142-146 infra.
128. It would be possible to consider problematic only those cases in which the U.S.
firms and the fairly trading foreign firms, taken together, have market power. But given the
likelihood that foreign competition cannot provide as strong a check on market power as
domestic competition can, it seems better to focus on the U.S. firms alone.
129. It is possible, if there is a foreign monopolist, that the U.S. firms are pricing above
cost under the monopoly "umbrella."

HeinOnline -- 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1192 1988-1989

May 1989]

"UNFAIR" TRADE INJURY
IV.

1193

IMPLEMENTATION

Without amending the trade statutes, it would be possible to implement a rough version of the approach to injury that I have described.
With some statutory modification, it would be possible to solve some of
the inevitable administrative problems without undermining the commitment to a general antidumping and countervailing duty regime. In
this part of the article, I first describe how this approach to the meaning
of material injury would apply under existing laws, and then I suggest
more far-reaching changes.
A.

Operation Under Existing Laws

There are virtually no limitations, other than time constraints, on
the ITC's ability to collect relevant economic evidence about the U.S.
industry that claims it is suffering from unfairly traded imports. In
some cases, the time limitations would be no more difficult to observe
under my approach than they are at present. In others, particularly
cases where the preliminary economic evidence indicates that an industry is performing inefficiently or is pricing at supracompetitive levels,
the present timetable would be more difficult to observe. Putting administrative constrictions to one side, however, the Commission is
quite well equipped to implement this approach to injury.
In a perfect world, the Commission would begin by constructing an
economically sound definition of the like products affected by its investigation. It then would collect data on the actual marginal cost for each
U.S. producer of the like products, and it would compare prices in the
market with marginal costs to see how much of a discrepancy existed. 130 Finally, it would look at the unfairly traded imports to see
whether the effect of the unfair trade practice was to reverse the comparative advantage that would exist between the two industries in the
absence of the unfair practice. Even if the U.S. industry were relatively
inefficient (either because of higher costs or because the unfair practice
reversed preexisting competitive advantages), it would be entitled to
relief if it collectively had no market power. Trade injury would exist
because the imports were injuring the U.S. industry as a result of the
unfair trade practice.
It is worth noting how this test differs from the similarly worded
requirement that existed until recently in section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930. Section 337 declared unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States,
130. Since this step is exceptionally difficult as a practical matter, the ITC in practice
would either develop presumptions about market power from other evidence (e.g., market
structure, rates of return) and assign "overcharge" figures accordingly, or it would need to
examine some surrogate for marginal cost, such as average variable cost. Cf Phillip Areeda &
Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricng and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
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•.. the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure
an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States
.
"...
131 Although the ITC never found a complaining industry not to
be efficiently and economically operated, presumably such a finding
would have barred relief altogether. In my proposal, on the other
hand, relief would be available even to an inefficient firm, if a competitively structured industry would also have suffered. In addition, my
proposal does not require the destruction of, or crippling injury to, the
U.S. industry before relief can be awarded. Rather, my approach mandates only that "material injury," as the term is defined in the statute,
must be shown, together with the causal link to the unfair trade
practice.
My proposal is also consistent with the existing law's conception of
the public interest, as it is expressed in the provisions allowing the termination or suspension of a proceeding. For both antidumping and
countervailing duty situations, a case may not be terminated or settled
by means of a quantitative restriction unless termination is in the public
interest.' 3 2 The public interest factors include "the relative impact on
the competitiveness of the domestic industry producing the like merchandise," and "whether, based upon the relative impact on consumer
prices and the availability of supplies of the merchandise, the agreement would have a greater adverse impact on United States consumers
33
than the imposition of ...duties."'
Furthermore, most of the evidence that the ITC presently collects
would continue to be of great importance. Industry output levels, the
market shares of the firms that have accurately been determined to be
in the industry, measures of productivity that suggest how efficiently
factors of production are being used, and of course domestic price
levels, are all significant. Other data are less useful, particularly measures derived from accounting rates of return, such as profit levels, neg1 34
ative cash flow, and the ability to raise capital.
In addition, the ITC is capable of making the additional judgments
that would be required. For example, the ITC may want to compare
the performance of the industry in question to other industries with
similar resource needs. The Commission could look at the ratio of the
market value of the firms in the industry to the replacement cost of
their assets-the measure of profitability referred to in the economic
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982), repealedby the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 § 1342, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 1212
(emphasis added). See also Harold Brandt & Wilhelm A. Zeitler, Unfair Import Trade Practice
Jurisdiction: The Applicability of Section 337 and the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws, 12
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95 (1980).
132. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(d)(1), 1673c(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
133. Id. §§ 1671c(a)(2)(B), 1673c(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
134. See Franklin Fisher & John McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to
Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 82 (1983).
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literature as Tobin's q.13 5 The critical point is that economists are quite
accustomed to making judgments about how competitive particular industries are. 136 In antitrust actions for damages caused by a monopoly
or a cartel, economic evidence on the amount of the overcharge-the
basis of the damages-is essential. 13 7 Although those judgments are no
more likely to be infallible than any other product of human labor, the
Commission could use the results to create broad performance categories. Competitively performing industries would be entitled automatically to a finding of trade injury. The ITC would need to examine
industries that do not perform competitively. If, after discounting for
the noncompetitive pricing that those industries are displaying, the
Commission concludes that they would still have been injured by the
unfair trade practice, then it should issue an affirmative finding of injury. If the Department of Commerce has also concluded that the unfair practice actually occurred, then duties would follow, measured by
the margin of dumping or subsidization.
The Commission could not continue its present treatment of evidence of lost sales, price undercutting, or price depression, however.
Such findings currently provide the strongest evidence of injury from
the unfair trade practice under investigation.' 38 If the customers of a
U.S. firm tell the government that they chose an imported product over
the product of the U.S. firm because of price, the ITC assumes that
something bad has occurred. Even if the imported product is priced
the same as, or slightly higher than, comparable U.S. products, the
Commission may still find price depression or suppression, if the import prices prevented increases in the U.S. prices.' 3 9 The discredited
135. See James Tobin, Monetary Policies and the Economy: The Transmission Mechanism, 37 S.
EcoN. J. 421 (1978); see also Mark Hirschey, Market Structure and Market Value, 58 J. Bus. 89
(1985); Eric Lindenberg & Stephen Ross, Tobin's q Ratio and IndustrialOrganization,54J. Bus. 1
(1981); Henry McFarland, Did RailroadDeregulation Lead to Monopoly Pricing?An Application of q,
60J. Bus. 385 (1987); Stephen Salinger, Tobin's q, Unionization,and the Concentration-ProfitsRelationship, 15 RAND J. ECON. 159 (1984); Michael Smirlock, Thomas Gilligan, & William Marshall, Tobin's q and the Structure-PerformanceRelationship, 74 Am. ECON. REv. 1051 (1984). I am
indebted to Professor William M. Landes for the suggestion that q ratios may be useful in this
connection.
136. The entire industrial organization field in economics is devoted to this issue. Commonly studied industries include the steel industry, the automobile industry, the aluminum
industry, the oil industry, railroads and air carriers, and shipping conferences.
137. 3 ANTrrrusT COUNSELING AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES §§ 36.02[l], 36.05[3] (J.
von Kalinowski ed. 1988); see also H. HOVENCAMP, supra note 92, § 14.2 at 359 (the monopoly

overcharge is the damage suffered), § 14.4 at 366 (discussing the importance of determining
the overcharge, despite difficulty of calculation).
138. See, e.g., Forged Steel Crankshafts from West Germany and U.K., USITC Pub. 2014,
Inv. Nos. 731-TA-351, -353 (Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1179, 1186 (Sept. 1987); Malleable
Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Thailand, USITC Pub. 2004, Inv. No. 731-TA-348 (Final), 10
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1037, 1041 (Aug. 1987); Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Philippines & Singapore, USITC Pub. 1907, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-293, -294, & -296 (Final), 9 I.T.R.D.
(BNA) 1361, 1369 (Nov. 1986); Agricultural Tillage Tools from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1761,
Inv. No. 701-TA-223 (Final), 8 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1028, 1030-31 (Oct. 1985).
139. See, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware from Mexico, People's Republic of
China, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1911, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-265 & 731-TA-297, -298, & -299
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antitrust price discrimination opinion in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. similarly condemned price competition because it led to a "drastically declining price structure" in the market for frozen pies. 1 40 A
declining price structure is, however, at least as likely to reflect a movement in prices down toward competitive levels as it is to indicate that
14 1
local firms will be forced to price below their own marginal cost.

Thus, evidence of price undercutting, lost sales, or price depression
should not support any inference of trade injury. Much of the time,
those phenomena will signal a beneficial competitive adjustment by the
U.S. industry, not the kind of trade injury that justifies tariff relief.
B. Statutory Changes
Two changes in the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
would help assure that they address only situations in which a less efficient foreign industry is assisted by an unfair practice. The first change
is a more far-reaching use of market structure data to determine the
appropriate remedy; the second is an open recognition of the trade-off
between consumer welfare and producer interests that is now only
weakly implicit in the injury requirement.
The relationship between market structure and market performance
has been studied for years. Although there are problems with inferring
likely performance from particular market structures, careful assumptions from market structure data are still likely to be informative. The
1984 MergerGuidelines, for example, still use a structural test as the starting point for determining when mergers are likely to lead to excessive
market power in the successor firm or are likely to facilitate anticompetitive collusion in the reconfigured market. Using the Herfindahl(Final), 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1587, 1593 (Nov. 1986); Malleable Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from
Thailand, U.S.I.T.C Pub. 2004, Inv. No. 731-TA-348 (Final), 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1037, 1042
(Aug. 1987).
140. 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967). For criticism of this decision, see, for example, ROBERT
BORK, THE ANTrriUST PARADOX 210, 386-87 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 92, § 6.12 at
188-89; LAWRENCE ANTHoNY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 687 (1977);
Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70
(1967). Professor Sullivan's remarks about the perversity of the Court's result in Utah Pie
apply with equal force to the price depression theory of the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws:
One can hardly conceive of an approach better calculated to protect oligopolistic
price structures against erosion; as soon as any multi-market firm begins to "cheat"
on the cartel or to undercut interdependent prices in any market, the other firms
there can sue to recover their lost monopoly profits. There is little doubt, on the
Utah Pie facts, that the plaintiff's profits .

.

. were lower, as a consequence of the

falling price levels, than they would have been had the large firms refrained from any
local reductions; but the healthy profits still being earned in the market strongly
suggested that all that happened was that some of the monopoly profits previously
being earned in an oligopolistic market had been squeezed out.
L. SULLIVAN, supra, at 687 (footnote omitted).
141. Note again that one should focus not on the relationship between the cost of the
import and its price, but on the cost of the like U.S. product, and whether the price of that
product is consistently well above marginal cost.
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Hirschman Index ("HHI"), 142 the Guidelines identify three kinds of
market structures: unconcentrated (HHI below 1,000); moderately concentrated (HHI between 1,000 and 1,800); and highly concentrated
(HHI above 1,800).143 Although the Department of Justice looks at a
great deal of industry-specific evidence after identifying what kind of
market is involved in a case, this taxonomy provides
a rough sense of
14 4
which mergers are likely to be troublesome.
The ITC could compute HHIs for the U.S. industry in a trade proceeding, just as the Department of Justice does in pre-merger review.
The Commission has, or can get, data on firms in the U.S. industry in
much the same way that the Department learns about the line of commerce affected by a merger. Furthermore, the time constraints on the
ITC are no greater than those on the Department of Justice. 1 4 5 Even
without statutory change, a sense of the resulting HHI would help the
Commission evaluate the possibility of noncompetitive pricing in an industry. With statutory change, however, the Commission could attack
the trade protection problem more directly. The Commerce Department would remain responsible for determining whether LTFV sales or
prohibited subsidies were present and for calculating the amount of the
margin of dumping or subsidization. The ITC would be responsible, in
connection with the injury finding, for ascertaining how competitively
the U.S. industry is structured.
An amended statute could divide available tariff relief into three categories, corresponding to the three regions of industry structure. (This
concededly is somewhat arbitrary, but it has the advantage of easy administrability. Congress could of course choose other levels.) However, one might decide that for industries that are unconcentrated, any
142. See notes 91 & 127 supra.
143. See ANrrrRusT DivisioN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 91,
at § 3.1.
144. The general approach of the Merger Guidelines is widely accepted. Current debate
has more to do with the particular thresholds that should give rise to a legal challenge to a
merger or to close scrutiny. See, e.g., John DeQ. Briggs, An Overview of Current Law and Policy
Relating to Mergers andAcquisitions,56 AwrrrusT LJ. 657, 664-65 670 (1988) (asserting that the
Department ofJustice actually uses much higher thresholds than those published in the Guidelines); HorizontalMerger Guidelines of the National Association ofAttorneys General, UJan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S-I (Mar. 12, 1987) (the state attorneys general,
while adopting HHI methodology, endorse a more aggressive enforcement policy and stricter
market definition approach). The same debate would be important for the ITC, if a market
structure system were adopted.
145. Mergers and acquisitions above certain size threshholds are covered by the HartScott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982). The act imposes a 30-day waiting period for most
transactions, with the possibility of an additional period of 20 days if either the Federal Trade
Commission or the Assistant Attorney General issues a "second request." By way of comparison, the ITC presently has 45 days from the date of the filing of a countervailing duty petition,
19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982), or an antidumping petition, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982), to
make its preliminary determination on the question of material injury or threat thereof. The
final determination of injury in a countervailing duty case may come at any time between 205
and 270 days, depending upon whether the case is considered extraordinarily complicated
and upon certain other factors. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 14, at 373 (timetable); Horlick,
supra note 101. The length of time is comparable for antidumping cases.
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resulting tariff would simply be the full amount of the margin of dumping or subsidization. For moderately concentrated industries, the ITC
would impose a tariff that is only 66 percent of the relevant margin.
For highly concentrated industries, perhaps with HHIs between 1800
and 4,000, the tariff would be 33 percent of the margin. Finally, for
industries with HHIs above 4,000, no tariff at all would be imposed.
For the unconcentrated industries, the full tariff is justified because
price levels in the United States probably reflect a presently efficient
U.S. industry. 146 If the foreign firms are able to take market share from
the U.S. firms because of the unfair trade practice, it is reasonable to
conclude that the unfair trade practice caused a shift in comparative
advantage away from the U.S. industry. The tariff then negates that
shift and restores the "natural" relative efficiency that would exist without the dumping or subsidization.
The reason to discount the tariff for more concentrated industries,
up to a full disallowance of the tariff in cases of extreme concentration,
is to maintain some competitive pressure on U.S. prices. This kind of
pressure benefits U.S. consumers both immediately, because it allows
the imported products to continue to enjoy somewhat lower prices, and
in the long run, since it forces U.S. industry to find ways to cut costs or
reduce profit levels. Complete disallowance of the tariff for industries
with U.S. HHIs above 4,000 is beneficial even if the U.S. firms alone do
not have the ability to exercise market power. In almost all such situations, the consumer welfare that would be sacrificed by imposing a tariff
on all imports would exceed the gains to producer welfare, including
47
the avoided costs of adjustment to imports.'
Since both the antidumping and countervailing duty laws mandate
that the duty be "equal to the amount by which the foreign market
value of the merchandise exceeds the United States price of the merchandise,"' 148 or "equal to the amount of the net subsidy determined or
estimated to exist," 1 4 9 it is clear that the sliding scale tariff based on
market structure could be implemented only through statutory amendment. One of the beneficial results of such an amendment would be to
bring the unfair trade practice rules of the United States closer to those
146. This would be particularly true if, in addition to competition among domestic firms,
competition existed from fairly traded imports.
147. For example, suppose a properly defined market had three firms: a foreign firm
(Fl) with 50% of the market, another foreign firm (F2) with 40% of the market, and a U.S.
firm (D) with 10% of the market. Suppose further that both F1 and F2 are enjoying significant subsidies from their home governments, and that D is suffering injury as a result of those
subsidies. As the law presently stands, and under the approach outlined in this article, D
would be entitled to have countervailing duties imposed on Fl's and F2's imports. However,
there is a great loss in U.S. consumer welfare on these facts, since consumers are now paying a
higher price for 90% of the products they purchase. Whether the U.S. as a whole would
benefit or suffer from a tariff on these facts is ultimately a policy question; the answer proposed here is that a tariff is not desirable.
148. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (1982).
149. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(1) (1982).
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of the E.C. The E.G. regulation permits the administering authority to
balance the injury to an E.C. industry against the interests of the Community as a whole. 150 It specifically permits the Council to order a duty
less than the margin of dumping or the amount of the subsidy "if such
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury."' 5 1
Indeed, the fact that the E.C. already has the kind of discretion to
look more broadly at Community interests and to adjust the level of
duty on a case-by-case basis indicates that nothing in the nature of
highly industrialized, developed societies would prevent the adoption
of the trade injury standard advocated here. In the end, it is a matter of
choice. We can either use an injury approach in the trade statutes that
takes as a given the existing industry structure, and preserves the monopolist along with the efficient small competitor, or we can refine our
notion of trade injury so that only the injury that flows from the distortions of comparative advantage will serve as a predicate to the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties.
V.

CONCLUSION

I have proceeded throughout this article on the premise that U.S.
industries in some cases have legitimate complaints about the disadvantages that they suffer when they must compete against dumped or subsidized foreign goods. It is also true, however, that U.S. consumers
always lose over the short run, and almost always lose over the long
run, when low-priced foreign goods are denied to them. I see no justification for depriving consumers of low-priced goods every time a producer must lower its price to meet foreign competition. Correction of
the effects of the "unfair" trade practices of dumping and subsidization
should occur only when competitively structured U.S. industries are
materially injured or threatened with material injury. When the U.S.
producers are monopolists or oligopolists, a principal effect of an antidumping or countervailing duty is to preserve some level of monopoly
rents. U.S. society as a whole is hurt, not helped, when this happens.
Important subgroups in society are particularly hurt, including producers that use the protected products as inputs and final consumers.
Attention to the kind of injury the U.S. industry has suffered can
prevent these undesirable results and at the same time help the producers that Congress, with strong political support, wishes to assist. I do
not address the way that LTFV margins should be measured or the in150. See Comm'n Dec. No. 2177/84/ECSC, arts. 11(l), 12(1), 27 0J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L, 201) 17, 28 (1984); Coundi Reg. (EEC) No. 2176/84, arts. 11(1), 12(1), 27 0J. EUR.
CoMM. (No. L 201) 1, 11-12 (1984). See generally Greyson Bryan & Dominique Boursereau,
Antidumping Law in the European Communities and the United States: A ComparativeAnalysis, 18 GEO.
WASH. J. INr'L L. & EcoN. 631 (1985); Larry Loftis, United States-EuropeanEconomic Community
Antidumping Laws: The Needfor a Comprehensive Approach, 15 GA. J. IN'L & CoMP. L. 453 (1985).
151. Council Reg. (EEC) No. 2176/84, art. 13(3), 27 0J.EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1, 12
(1984).
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tractable problem of detecting and estimating countervailable foreign
subsidies, only because these are wholly separate problems under the
trade laws. Margins are not irrelevant, of course, since the margin of
dumping or subsidization may reveal that the foreign industry is more
efficient than the U.S. industry no matter what, or that the problems in
the U.S. industry could not have been caused by the unfair trade practice. However, for now I take as a given whatever margin is determined
to exist under the present statutes.
With careful attention to the competitive structure of the U.S. industry affected by unfairly traded imports and better use of the data
already available to the International Trade Commission, a new concept of trade injury can be implemented. This new concept helps to
keep the unfair trade statutes from indiscriminately expanding into areas better addressed by frankly protectionist laws, and therefore legitimates them as levelers rather than tilters of the playing field. If
Congress and the Commission adopted the trade injury standard,
scholars and policymakers alike could stop worrying about the alleged
fundamental inconsistency between the trade laws and the antitrust
laws, and begin serious work on new ways to reap the advantages of
international trade without penalizing efficient and competitive U.S.
industries.
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